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even	 after	 the	 tradtonal	 appeals	 process	 has	 been	 exhausted,	 ndvduals	
contnue	to	challenge	crmnal	convctons.	ordnarly	the	courts	do	not	permt	
further appeals as the finality of decisions is central to the legitimacy of the 
crmnal	justce	system.1	That	sad,	facts	can	emerge	followng	these	ordnary	
appeals	processes	that	dsprove	or	cast	doubt	over	a	convcton,	and	so	specal	
procedures	have	been	ntroduced	n	many	jursdctons	for	cases	that	may	be	
consdered	‘mscarrages	of	justce’2	n	whch	t	would	be	nherently	unjust	not	to	
permt	further	appeal	or	nvestgaton.	These	specal	procedures	are,	as	well	shall	
see,	a	recent	phenomenon,	emergng	predomnantly	n	the	last	two	decades.
for	those	who	work	wthn	the	crmnal	justce	system,	as	well	as	for	socety	
more	generally,	the	dea	that	a	mscarrage	of	justce	can	occur	s	qute	repugnant.	
The	term	brngs	to	mnd	cases	such	as	the	Brmngham	Sx	or	Guldford	four	
nvolvng	ndvduals	locked	away	for	lengthy	perods	of	tme	for	a	crme	they	
dd	not	commt.	we	may	also	thnk	of	extreme	cases	from	countres	such	as	
the	Unted	States	where	persons	have	been	sentenced	to	death	only	for	t	later	
to be confirmed that they did not commit the particular crime.	we	nherently	
lnk	mscarrages	of	justce	wth	nnocence.	yet	the	language	of	the	term	s	not	
so restrictive, and implies that a broader definition can be contemplated, one 
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1.	 See	kate	Malleson,	‘appeals	aganst	convcton	and	the	prncple	of	fnalty’	(1994)	
21	JLS	151.
2.	 it	should	be	noted	at	ths	pont	that	a	wde	varety	of	terms	has	been	used	n	the	lterature	
and	some	legal	systems	to	descrbe	these	cases,	rangng	from	‘mscarrage	of	justce’	to	
‘wrongful	convcton’.	Ths	wll	be	dscussed	n	detal	n	secton	ii	but	we	use	the	term	
‘mscarrage	of	justce’	throughout	as	ths	s	the	term	that	has	been	adopted	by	the	legal	
systems	n	ireland	and	the	Uk,	as	well	as	n	nternatonal	human	rghts	nstruments.	
.	 The	 innocence	project	 states	 that	 17	people	 have	 spent	 tme	on	death	 row	before	
DNA testing proved their innocence. This figure, available on their website <www.
nnocenceproject.org>	(accessed	28	May	2012)	excludes	exoneratons	post-executon	
based	on	evdence	other	than	dna.	Most	recently	colomba	Law	School	have	publshed	
a	 report	 clamng	 that	 an	 nnocent	man	was	executed	 n	Texas	 n	1989:	 see	 James	
Leberman,	‘Los	Tocayos	carlos’	(2012)	4()	colomba	human	rghts	L	rev	(entre	
ssue).	
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encompassng	all	cases	n	whch	justce	has	not	been	done	or	carred.	There	
may	be	nstances	where,	due	to	breaches	of	human	and	consttutonal	rghts,	
it becomes difficult to claim that justice has been served or that the individual 
has	been	rightfully	convcted.	whether	or	not	to	nclude	such	cases	n	a	legal	
definition of the term is currently an important debate. Many countries, including 
france,4	canada5	and,	untl	recently,	the	Unted	kngdom,	opt	to	lmt	the	term	
to an innocence definition which, most practically speaking, prevents applicants 
who	cannot	prove	nnocence	from	securng	compensaton.	Ths	artcle	examnes	
how the Irish courts have dealt with this difficult issue and developed an approach 
embedded	n	human	rghts.	
There have been a number of high-profile instances of miscarriages of 
justce	n	ireland	over	the	past	decades:7	the	cases	of	the	Tallaght	Two,8	nora	
wall	(Sr	domnc),9	frank	Shortt,10	and,	more	recently,	Mchael	hannon	and	
Martn	conmey.11	a	number	of	other	controversal	convctons	were	overturned	
or	pardoned,	though	not	legally	declared	mscarrages	of	justce	(and	so	have	no	
automatc	rght	to	compensaton),	ncludng	ncky	kelly12	and	peter	prngle.1	
There	have	also	been	a	number	of	cases	that	show	further	nstances	where	the	
problems	wthn	the	system	can	lead	to	njustce:	the	cases	of	dean	Lyons,14	the	
4.	 nathale	dongos,	‘wrongful	convctons	n	france:	The	Lmts	of	Pourvoi en Révision’	
n	c	ronald	huff	 and	Martn	kllas	 (eds),	Wrongful Conviction: International 
Perspectives on Miscarriages of Justice	(Temple	Unversty	press	2008).
5.	 kathryn	M	campbell,	‘The	fallblty	of	Justce	n	canada:	a	crtcal	examnaton	of	
convcton	revew’	n	huff	and	kllas	(eds)	bd.
.	 hannah	Qurk,	‘identfyng	Mscarrages	of	Justce:	why	innocence	n	the	Uk	s	not	the	
answer’	(2007)	70	MLr	759,	and	for	the	most	recent	court	rulng	see	R v MacDermott 
and McCartney	[2011]	UkSc	18.	
7.	 Ths	lst	contans	those	cases	that	have	attracted	a	degree	of	attenton.	it	can	be	assumed	
that	there	are	many	other	cases	n	whch	a	mscarrage	of	justce	was	avoded	but	have	
not	been	brought	to	publc	attenton.
8.	 The People (DPP) v Meleady and Grogan	[2001]	4	ir	1	(cca).	Meleady	and	Grogan	
were convicted of theft of a vehicle but following their release secured a certificate of 
mscarrage	of	justce	when	t	was	revealed	that	forensc	testng,	whch	proved	they	had	
not	been	n	the	front	seat	of	the	car	as	alleged,	had	not	been	dsclosed	to	the	defence.	
9.	 [2005]	iecca	140.	nora	wall,	also	known	as	Sster	domnc,	was	convcted	of	rape	
and imprisoned for life but later was granted a certificate of miscarriage of justice.
10.	 [2002]	2	ir	9	(cca).	frank	Shortt	was	convcted	of	drugs	offences	and	served	three	
years in prison before being granted a certificate for a miscarriage of justice.
11.	 [2009]	iecca	4.	Mchael	hannon	was	convcted	of	sexual	assault.	Twelve	years	later	
t	was	declared	a	mscarrage	of	justce	when	the	alleged	vctm	of	the	offence	recanted	
and admitted she had falsified the allegations. 
12.	 [198]	ir	1	(Sc).	ncky	kelly	was	convcted	of	the	Sallns	Mal	Tran	robbery	on	
the	bass	of	confesson	evdence,	despte	contnued	clams	of	severe	physcal	abuse	
durng	 detenton.	he	was	 ultmately	 granted	 a	 presdental	 pardon	 and	 awarded	
compensaton.	
1.	 2	frewen	57.	peter	prngle	was	convcted	of	murderng	a	garda	despte	garda	msconduct	
throughout	the	nvestgaton	and	tral.	hs	convcton	was	ultmately	quashed.	
14.	 dean	Lyons,	a	heron	addct	wth	borderlne	mental	handcap,	confessed	to	murders	
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hayes	famly15	and	frank	McBrearty.1	from	ths	range	of	cases	t	s	clear	that	
mscarrages	of	justce	occur	n	ireland.	in	lght	of	that,	clarty	s	needed	on	how	
the term is defined in Irish law. Legislation providing remedies for miscarriages 
of	justce	s	relatvely	new,	havng	been	ntroduced	n	the	crmnal	procedure	
act	n	199.	yet	snce	then	the	jursprudence	from	these	cases	that	analyses	the	
1993 Act provides that clarity. The Superior Courts in Ireland have definitively 
stated	 that	 the	 term	‘mscarrage	of	 justce’	 n	 ireland	 s	much	broader	 than	
nnocence,	referrng	also	to	nstances	of	‘grave	defects	n	the	admnstraton	of	
justce’,	cases	where	the	prosecuton	should	never	have	been	brought	due	to	a	
lack	of	evdence,	and	cases	n	whch	the	procedure	adopted	was	rreconclable	
wth	judcal	and	consttutonal	procedure.	
nascent	as	the	irsh	procedure	s,	ths	s	an	mpressvely	strong	stance	that	
sts	 counter	 to	developments	 n	many	countres	 and	dsplays	an	 rrevocable	
dedcaton	to	due	process,	consttutonal	values	and	human	rghts.	in	ths	artcle,	
we examine the development of the definition, which has not at all times been 
steady.	Untl	199	and	the	passng	of	the	crmnal	procedure	act	there	was	no	
definitive legal concept of a miscarriage of justice in Irish law. The legislation 
does not provide a definition of the key term, leaving this task to the courts. 
This article will begin by considering why the definition and application of the 
term	s	so	problematc,	followed	by	a	conceptual	and	theoretcal	dscusson	of	
the	term	‘mscarrage	of	justce’.	it	wll	then	look	at	why	the	change	n	irsh	law	
occurred	n	199,	wth	a	short	overvew	of	the	new	law.	The	focus	wll	then	turn	
to	a	substantve	dscusson	of	the	case	law	on	the	ssue,	chartng	the	evoluton	of	
the definition and difficulties that faced the judiciary. The article will conclude 
wth	a	dscusson	supportng	the	approach	of	the	irsh	judcary,	argung	that	t	
presents	an	mportant	challenge	to	legal	systems	nternatonally.
n	Grangegorman	n	1997	to	whch	someone	else	later	confessed.	followng	hs	death	
the	Report of the Commission of Investigation into the Dean Lyons Case	(Statonery	
Office Dublin 2006), conducted by Mr Birmingham SC, found that while there was 
no	delberate	breach	of	hs	rghts,	dean	Lyons	had	been	asked	napproprate	leadng	
questons	durng	hs	nterrogaton.		
15.	 in	1984	Joanne	hayes	and	her	famly	all	falsely	confessed	to	the	murder	of	a	baby.	The	
Report of the Tribunal of Inquiry into the ‘Kerry Babies Case’	by	Mr	Justce	kevn	
Lynch (Stationery Office Dublin 1985), failed to find fault with the conduct of gardaí 
nvolved,	an	outcome	that	has	been	heavly	crtcsed:	see	Tom	ingls,	Truth, Power 
and Lies: Irish Society and the Case of the Kerry Babies	(Unversty	college	dubln	
press	200).
1.	 frank	McBrearty	was	wrongfully	accused	of	the	murder	of	rchard	Barron	n	october	
199,	 subsequent	 to	 a	 false	 confesson	made	 n	 custody,	 consdered	by	 the	Morrs	
Trbunal.	See	Report on the Detention of ‘Suspects’ Following the Death of the Late 
Richard Barron on the 14th of October 1996 and Related Detentions and Issues	
(Stationery Office Dublin 2006). 
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I. The DIlemma PoseD by mIscarrIages of JusTIce
Mscarrages	of	justce,	as	a	phenomenon,	embody	fundamental	challenges	for	
crmnal	 justce	 systems	embedded	 n	human	 rghts	 and	due	process.	These	
cases	by	 ther	very	nature	 reveal	a	grave	error	 n	 the	 system:	 n	nether	 the	
trial nor the appeals system has it been identified that someone who should not 
have	been	convcted	has	been	convcted.	in	order	to	mantan	the	ntegrty	and	
legtmacy	of	the	system,	partcularly	gven	the	commtment	to	due	process	and	
human	rghts,	a	mechansm	for	rectfyng	ths	error	must	be	developed.	whle	
debates	rage	on	how	best	to	do	that	n	terms	of	these	normatve	aspects,	one	
core	challenge17 is identifying who can benefit from that mechanism and when 
we	wll	admt	that	an	error	has	occurred	that	needs	rectfyng.	The	system	must	
balance	a	spectrum	of	factors:	
—	 The	recognton	that	errors	do	occur;	
—	 The	requrement	to	remedy	these	errors,	f	due	process	s	a	prmary	
concern	of	the	system;	
—	 The	admsson	that	we	do	not	wsh	to	see	gulty	persons	set	free;	
—	 The	challenge	posed	by	the	endorsement	of	the	convcton	of	a	gulty	
person	where	ther	fundamental	rghts	were	breached	to	secure	t;	
—	 The	concern	that	f	we	regularly	admt	errors	and	declare	mscarrages	
of	justce	t	wll	brng	the	legtmacy	and	ntegrty	of	the	system	nto	
dsrepute;
—	 and	the	equally	vald,	though	crcular,	concern	that	f	we	do	not	rectfy	
errors	where	requred,	the	system	s	equally	lackng	n	ntegrty.	
we	must	 therefore	 carefully	 dentfy	when	 remedes	 should	 be	 provded,	
respectful	of	 the	need	 to	protect	due	process	as	a	value	worth	chershng	 n	
tself,	the	rghts	of	the	ndvdual,	and	the	ntegrty	of	the	system.	we	beleve	
that	there	are	two	sets	of	concerns	at	play	here:	practcal	concerns	and	value	
concerns.	from	a	practcal	concern	perspectve,	f	we	apply	the	term	to	persons	
who	can	satsfy	the	system	that	they	dd	not	commt	the	crme	(.e.	who	can	prove	
their innocence) then we can be confident that we are not detaching liability 
from	gulty	persons,	nor	are	we	undermnng	the	system	wth	regular	quashng	
of	convctons.	on	the	other	hand,	f	we	consder	value	concerns,	where	due	
process	and	human	rghts	are	valued	above	such	practcal	consderatons,	then	
that	may	dctate	that,	where	those	values	have	not	been	respected,	a	convcton	
should not stand. These tensions are real and difficult and how we define them 
17.	 There	are	many	other	challenges	that	could	be	dscussed:	who	should	determne	whether	
or	not	there	s	a	case	to	be	consdered?	who	should	determne	whether	or	not	there	
has	been	a	mscarrage	of	justce?	what	evdence	should	be	consdered?	who	should	
determne	what	compensaton	should	be	pad?
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has	fundamental	consequences	not	just	for	the	system	but	also	for	those	who	
challenge	ther	convctons.	
The definition of the term also has very direct implications for the applicant, 
as it determines who may or may not benefit from the process. There are three 
core benefits relating to liberty, compensation and the declaratory effect of 
the term and these will only be enjoyed by a person to whom the definition 
apples.
frst,	 and	 of	most	 mmedate	 concern,	 n	many	 nstances	 the	 clamant	
may	stll	be	mprsoned.	They	wll	often	have	exhausted	the	ordnary	appeals	
mechansms	 and	 ths	may	 be	 the	 only	 opton	 to	 secure	 ther	 release	 from	
prson.	Ths	result	can,	of	course,	be	acheved	through	other	means,	whereby	a	
convcton	can	be	overturned	and	a	person	released	through	specal	procedures	
without this term being applied. It is, therefore, the other benefits that set the 
mscarrages	of	justce	process	apart	from	alternatve	relefs	avalable.	
Second,	nternatonal	nstruments	such	as	the	iccpr	and	the	echr	mpose	
requrements	 for	 compensaton	 to	 be	 pad	 to	 persons	who	 have	 suffered	 a	
mscarrage	of	justce.	The	echr	states:	
When a person has by a final decision been convicted of a criminal 
offence	 and	when	 subsequently	 hs	 convcton	 has	 been	 reversed,	 or	
he	has	been	pardoned,	on	 the	ground	 that	 a	new	or	newly	dscovered	
fact	shows	conclusvely	that	there	has	been	a	mscarrage	of	justce,	the 
person who has suffered punishment as a result of such conviction shall be 
compensated	accordng	to	the	law	or	the	practce	of	that	State	concerned,	
unless	t	s	proved	that	the	non-dsclosure	of	the	unknown	fact	n	tme	s	
wholly	or	partly	attrbutable	to	hm.18	
Gven	the	mpact	that	a	convcton,	partcularly	for	a	serous	offence,	can	have	
on	the	ndvdual	on	both	a	personal	and	professonal	level,	compensaton	can	
play	an	 mportant	 role	 n	 rentegraton	 to	 socety.	Grounds	has	documented	
how	the	psychologcal	consequences	of	mprsonment	can	be	lkened	to	those	
experenced	by	war	veterans.19	for	nstance,	n	one	of	the	cases	n	ireland	where	
a	mscarrage	of	justce	has	been	found,	the	court	made	the	followng	statement	
about	the	applcant’s	experences:
From the time he was first charged with the offences for which he was 
wrongly convicted up to the time when he was granted his certificate of a 
mscarrage	of	justce	by	the	court	of	crmnal	appeal	the	plantff	lved	
18.	 art	,	protocol	7,	echr	(emphass	added);	art	14()	iccpr.
19.	 adran	 Grounds,	 ‘psychologcal	 consequences	 of	wrongful	 convcton	 and	
imprsonment’	(2004)	4(2)	canadan	Journal	of	crmnology	and	crmnal	Justce	
15–82;	adran	Grounds,	‘Understandng	the	effects	of	wrongful	imprsonment’	(2005)	
2	crme	and	Justce	1–58.
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through	a	nghtmare	of	kafkaesque	proportons	whch	enveloped	hs	entre	
exstence.	everythng	he	stood	for,	had	strved	for	or	aspred	to	seemed	
set	at	nought.	it	s	a	nghtmare	from	whch	he	has	only	relatvely	recently	
emerged	but	he	wll	never	escape	the	full	consequences	of	ths	dreadful	
and	traumatc	perod	n	hs	lfe....	The	plantff	suffered	loss	of	lberty	wth	
all	the	gnomny	of	beng	condemned	as	a	crmnal	by	the	State.20	
whle	nothng	can	undo	the	mpact	of	a	wrongful	convcton,	the	payment	of	
compensaton	may	have	some	restoratve	value,	gong	some	way	to	rght	the	
wrong	done.	
Thrd,	there	s	the	declaratory	effect	of	a	statement	of	mscarrage	of	justce.	
from	the	moment	that	a	person	s	arrested	n	relaton	to	an	offence,	a	stgma	
attaches that is difficult to avoid. Family relationships, community standing 
and	professonal	reputaton	may	all	have	been	destroyed.	The	reputatons	of	
those	close	to	the	convcted	person	may	also	have	been	tarnshed,	possbly	to	
the	extent	that	they	have	been	forced	to	relocate.	To	have	the	State	admt	clearly	
that	ths	should	not	have	happened,	and	that	the	ndvdual	should	not	have	been	
convcted,	can	act	as	a	key	step	n	restorng	the	lfe	of	that	ndvdual.	a	smple	
quashng	of	convcton	wll	not	have	the	same	mpact	for	the	ndvdual	as	the	
declaraton	of	a	mscarrage	of	justce	may	have.	
In addition to these benefits experienced by the successful applicant, the 
outcome	can	also	have	a	strong	accountablty	functon	as	the	declaraton	s	the	
strongest	statement	that	a	court	can	make	n	such	a	case.	if	the	case	nvolved	
wrong-dong	on	the	part	of	agents	of	the	State	–	be	t	polce,	prosecuton,	lawyers	
or	members	 of	 the	 judcary	 –	 a	 pronouncement	 of	 that	 fact	 n	 open	 court,	
followed	by	an	award	of	damages,	wll	expose	the	msconduct	of	those	agents	
and	possbly	prompt	reform	so	that	there	s	no	recurrence	of	the	behavour.	in	
england	and	wales	the	Macpherson	report	concernng	the	polce	nvestgaton	
nto	the	death	of	Stephen	Lawrence21	led	to	the	creaton	of	the	independent	polce	
complants	commsson,22	and	n	ireland	the	Morrs	Trbunal	reports	nto	polce	
corruption in Donegal were a catalyst in the creation of the Garda Síochána 
ombudsman	commsson.2	and,	as	we	wll	see,	throughout	canada	and	the	
US	mscarrages	of	justce	are	revewed	by	panels	charged	wth	examnng	the	
causes	and	makng	of	recommendatons	n	relaton	to	the	case.
These	repercussons	wll	only	arse	where	the	term	‘mscarrage	of	justce’	s	
20.	 Shortt v Commissioner of an Garda Síochána, Ireland and the AG	[2007]	4	ir	587,	
[92/9]	(Sc).
21.	 Justce	Macpherson,	The Stephen Lawrence Inquiry	(hMSo	1999).	
22.	 created	by	the	polce	reform	act	2002,	becomng	operatonal	n	2004	and	ntroducng,	
for the first time, independent investigations of serious police misconduct in England 
and	wales.
2. Created by the Garda Síochána Act 2005. See Vicky Conway, The Blue Wall of Silence: 
The Morris Tribunal and Police Accountability in the Republic of Ireland	 (irsh	
academc	press	2010).
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deemed to apply to a case; the narrower the definition, the fewer the cases that 
will fall within its ambit and the fewer the people who will enjoy these benefits. 
yet	precsely	because	of	these	mplcatons	the	term	should	only	be	appled	n	
mertorous	cases.	Ths	ponts	to	the	crux	of	the	matter:	when	should	t	apply?	
what	exactly	consttutes	a	mscarrage	of	justce?
II. PossIble resPonses To The DIlemma
As we have identified, debate on the definition centres on whether the term 
should	be	 lmted	 to	 cases	of	 actual	 nnocence,	 or	whether	 cases	where	 the	
ndvdual	may	be	factually	gulty	but	ther	rghts	were	fundamentally	breached	
to	 secure	 a	 convcton	 should	be	 ncluded.	 it	 cannot	be	dened	 that	 there	 s	
great normative appeal to restricting the definition to innocence. As Steiker 
and	Steker	outlne,	there	are	certan	characterstcs	of	cases	of	nnocence	that	
set	them	apart	and	lend	them	more	readly	to	extraordnary	measures	and	the	
awardng	of	compensaton.24	perhaps	the	most	obvous	pont	they	address	s	that	
the punishment that has been imposed does not fit the crime, as none has been 
commtted.	Ths	of	course	relates	to	the	fact	that	the	actual	offender	remans	
at	large,	creatng	rsk	for	socety,	and	to	the	fact	that	the	actual	offender	has	
managed	to	evade	justce,	undermnng	the	prncple	of	deterrence,	whch	s	
supposed	to	be	one	of	the	goals	of	punshment.	combnng	these	ponts	t	s	also	
the	case	that	punshment	of	the	nnocent	and	falure	to	capture	actual	offenders	
reduces	the	legtmacy	of	the	crmnal	justce	system.	There	s	addtonal	cruelty	
n	the	mposton	of	punshment	on	an	nnocent	person	as,	from	arrest	to	tral	
and	sentencng,	that	person	s	aware	of	ther	nnocence	and	knows	they	do	not	
deserve	what	s	happenng.	fnally,	n	countres	where	the	death	penalty	apples,	
the	harm	done	s	rrevocable.25
Undoubtedly	these	are	seductve	qualtes	and	actvsts	and	campagners	have	
often	adopted	ths	approach.	innocence	projects,	whch	now	exst	n	all	common	
law	jursdctons2	and	beyond,	have	ascrbed	to	ths	poston,	dentfyng	as	ther	
24.	 carol	Steker	and	Jordan	Steker,	‘The	Seducton	of	innocence:	The	attracton	and	
Lmtatons	of	 the	focus	on	 innocence	 n	captal	punshment	Law	and	advocacy’	
(2005)	95(2)	Journal	of	crmnal	Law	and	crmnology	587.
25.	 bd	59.	
2.	 The	innocence	network	s	a	consortum	of	such	groups	from	across	amerca,	australa,	
Canada, the United Kingdom and New Zealand: see <www.innocencenetwork.org> 
accessed 29 May 2012. An Innocence Project has recently been established in Griffith 
College Dublin in Ireland: see <www.gcd.ie/innocenceproject> accessed 29 May 
2012.	a	student-led	Mscarrages	of	Justce	project	has	been	formed	at	the	Unversty	
of Limerick, which uses the broader definition of the term in its analyses: see http://
www2.ul.e/web/www/facultes/arts%2c_humantes_%2_Socal_Scences/
School_of_Law/advanced_Lawyerng_projects/Mscarrages_of_Justce/>	 accessed	
29	May	2012.
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central	goal	the	overturnng	of	the	convctons	of	nnocent	people.27	however,	
there are drawbacks to restricting the definition to innocence. For one, it sets 
the	bar	too	hgh,	creatng	an	evdental	requrement	to	prove	nnocence	very	few	
would	satsfy.28	as	we	wll	see,	n	ireland	there	has	only	been	one	case	where	the	
applicant could have satisfied the courts of innocence: in the others there was 
no	evdence	that	could	postvely	prove	nnocence.	as	nobles	and	Schff	have	
stated,	‘nnocence	s	not	somethng	that	exsts,	out	there,	to	be	touched,	felt,	or	
measured,	any	more	than	gult’.29	indeed,	t	would	be	to	apply	a	standard	that	
is not present at other stages of the system; juries, for example, make findings 
of ‘not guilty’, rather than a finding of innocence. 
Such a restrictive definition may also ignore a large subset of cases. Walker 
defines a miscarriage of justice as a case in which the conviction represents ‘a 
falure	to	attan	the	desred	end	result	of	“justce”’.0	he	outlnes	sx	nstances	
n	whch	a	mscarrage	of	justce	can	occur:	
[F]irst, deficient processes or second, the laws which are applied to them, 
or third, because there is no factual justification for the applied treatment 
or	punshment;	fourth,	whenever,	suspects	or	defendants	or	convcts	are	
treated	adversely	by	the	state	to	a	dsproportonate	extent	n	comparson	
with the need to protect the rights of others; fifth, whenever the rights of 
others	are	not	effectvely	or	proportonately	protected	or	vndcated	by	
State	acton	aganst	wrongdoers	or,	sxth,	by	State	law	tself.1
Ths	 s	 not	 restrcted	 to	 cases	of	 factual	 nnocence	 and	 could	 nclude	 cases	
where	the	accused	dd	commt	the	crme,	wth	the	requste	ntent,	but	where	
the	accused’s	rghts	were	breached	to	such	an	extent	that	the	result	cannot	be	
considered just. The emphasis, in this definition, is placed on the operation of 
the criminal justice system. As Naughton states, the term ‘denotes an official 
and	 systemc	 acknowledgement	 of	what	mght	 be	 termed	 a	 breach	 of	 the	
“carrage	of	justce”,	the	rules	and	procedures	that	together	make	up	the	crmnal	
justce	process,	and	 t	bears	no	 relaton	 to	whether	a	successful	appellant	 s	
factually	gulty	or	factually	nnocent’.2	naughton’s	statement	drects	attenton	
27.	 The	innocence	project	n	new	york:	the	foundng	project	lmts	ts	work	to	cases	where	
innocence can be proven by DNA testing: see <www.innocenceproject.org> accessed 
29	May	2012.
28.	 Ths	 s	 partcularly	 the	 case	 n	 the	 context	 of	dna	 testng,	whch	 s	 prohbtvely	
expensve,	to	the	extent	that	laws	have	been	passed	n	a	number	of	states	provdng	a	
rght	to	dna	testng.	
29.	 rchard	nobles	and	davd	Schff,	‘Gult	and	innocence	n	the	crmnal	Justce	System:	
a	comment	on	R (Mullen) v Secretary of State for the Home Department’	(200)	9	
MLr	80,	91.
0.	 clve	walker	and	ker	Starmer,	Justice in Error	(Blackstone	press	199)	2.
1.	 bd	4–.
2. Michael Naughton, ‘Redefining Miscarriages of Justice: A Revived Human-Rights 
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to	the	wordng	of	the	phrase	‘mscarrage	of	justce’.	That	the	term	relates	to	
the	carrage	of	justce	lnks	to	processes:	has	justce	been	carred	on	ts	road	
approprately?	has	the	way	t	has	been	acheved	been	rght?	There	s,	n	many	of	
these	debates	and	jursdctons,	use	of	alternatve	phraseology,	such	as	‘wrongful	
convctons’,	but	even	that	term,	whch	suggests	that	the	convcton	s	wrong,	
s	open	to	applcaton	to	both	questons	of	nnocence	and	serous	procedural	
njustce.	internatonal	human	rghts	nstruments	use	the	term	mscarrage	of	
justce,	whch	s	not	of	tself	exclusvely	referrng	to	cases	of	nnocence.
There is also the broader impact that the definitional issue can have. Quirk 
has	argued	that	an	nnocence	approach	would	effectvely	sancton	‘noble	cause	
corrupton’4	n	the	nvestgaton	and	prosecuton	of	crme,	whereby	the	ends	
justfy	 the	means.	whle	 those	who	cannot	establsh	 nnocence	may	be	 n	a	
position to establish sufficient doubt to have their convictions overturned through 
these	extraordnary	appeals	procedures,	 the	hghest	condemnaton	would	be	
reserved	for	nnocent	persons.	it	would	lessen	our	commtment	to	due	process,	
consttutonal	values	and	human	rghts,	whch	would	become	secondary	to	the	
queston	of	gult	or	nnocence.	
it	may	be	countered	that	the	hghest	condemnaton	ought	to	be	reserved	for	
nnocent	persons,	but	the	vew	that	cases	of	wrongful	convcton	of	nnocent	
persons	are	the	worst-case	scenaro	mght	be	msplaced.	Steker	and	Steker,	
commentng	on	the	amercan	context,	mantan	that	‘such	errors	mght	be	worse	
when	they	happen	but	collectvely	they	are	not	necessarly	the	worst	part	of	
our	captal	punshment	system’.5	The	regular	use	of	llegal,	unconsttutonal	
nterrogaton	or	 nvestgaton	methods	 that	breach	human	 rghts	 s	 arguably	
deservng	of	much	greater	concern	than	the	rregular	convcton	of	an	nnocent	
person.	Qurk	 has	 sad	 that	 a	 focus	 on	 nnocence	mnmses	 the	 scale	 of	
problems	n	the	crmnal	justce	system	and	thereby	the	mpetus	for	reform.	
where	a	mscarrage	of	justce	occurs,	t	s	generally	accompaned	by	a	publc	
examnaton	 as	 to	what	went	wrong,	 and	why.	wthout	 such	 examnatons,	
abhorrent	practces	mght	go	unnvestgated	and	reman	accepted	by	polce,	
prosecutors	and	the	courts,	thus	embeddng	Qurk’s	‘noble	cause	corrupton’	
nto	the	crmnal	justce	system.	
fnally,	Steker	and	Steker	fundamentally	queston	the	normatve	attachment	
to	nnocence:	
the	 harm	of	 punshng	 nnocents	 resonates	wth	 the	 publc	 precsely	
because	most	amercans	 can	 empathze	wth	 the	harms	 that	 they	 fear	
approach	to	Unearth	Subjugated	dscourses	of	wrongful	crmnal	convcton’	(2004)	
45	BJc	15,	19.
.	 for	nstance,	huff	and	kllas	(eds)	(n	4).
4.	 Qurk	(n	).
5.	 Steker	and	Steker	(n	24).
.	 Qurk	(n	)	77.
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could	happen	to	themselves,	rather	than	those	that	happen	only	to	‘bad	
people’.	Lurkng	behnd	nnocence’s	appeal,	then,	mght	be	ndfference	
f	not	hostlty	to	other	types	of	njustce.7
Unless	a	person	can	prove	ther	 nnocence,	an	atttude	of	‘there’s	no	smoke	
without fire’ may prevail, suggesting that the convicted person deserves whatever 
they	get,	f	not	for	ths	crme	then	for	somethng	else	they	have	done.	Ths	may	
equally	undermne	the	legtmacy	of	the	system.	
analysng	 these	 opposng	 perspectves	 theoretcally	 one	 could	 look	 to	
packer’s	 two	models	 of	 the	 crmnal	 justce	 system,	 crme	 control	 and	due	
process,	whch	represent	extremes	on	a	spectrum.8	These	represent	competng	
value	systems,	n	tenson	wth	each	other	n	any	crmnal	justce	system.	The	
crme	control	model	promotes	the	‘represson	of	crmnal	conduct’	as	a	‘guarantor	
of social freedom’. Value is attached to efficiency in the apprehension, trying, 
convctng	and	dsposng	of	offenders.	The	crmnal	justce	system	represents	
an	 assembly	 lne	 n	whch	 ‘ceremonous	 rtuals	whch	 do	 not	 advance	 the	
progress	of	a	case’	are	excluded.	at	each	pont	on	the	conveyor	belt	the	case	
s	further	developed	toward	the	goal	of	a	convcton.	non-offenders	should	be	
screened	out	early	and	a	presumpton	of	gult	operates	from	then	on.	fnalty	s	
a	central	value.	on	the	opposte	end	of	the	spectrum	sts	the	obstacle	course	that	
s	the	due	process	model.	in	ths	model	each	stage	presents	hurdles	that	must	
be	overcome	f	the	case	s	to	move	to	the	next	stage.	The	possblty	of	error	s	
core to this perspective, even if efficiency must be sacrificed. Quality control 
is valued above output and finality is not valued. 
applyng	ths	 to	 the	debates	at	hand,	nether	perspectve	s	purely	crme	
control. All proponents advocate reviewing cases, which violates the finality tenet 
of crime control. However, those that advocate a broad definition are clearly at a 
further	pont	on	the	due	process	spectrum.	an	nnocence-based	approach	exhbts	
many	of	the	crme-control	concerns:	a	dedcaton	to	convcton	of	the	gulty,	
not	prortsng	the	‘qualty’	of	the	system	above	convctons	and	a	lmtaton	of	
when	appeals	should	be	possble.	further	revews	should	be	possble	where	the	
wrong	person	has	been	convcted	but	not	where	a	person	was	wrongly	convcted.	
The broad definition, on the other hand, advocates an encompassing concept of 
when	extraordnary	appeals	should	be	permtted	due	to	the	need	to	ensure	and	
uphold	the	ntegrty	and	qualty	of	the	system.	
our	perspectve	n	ths	pece	algns	wth	a	strong	concept	of	due	process:	
our	analyss	of	the	dscourses	outlned	above	leads	us	to	the	concluson	that	
for	the	ntegrty	of	the	system,	partcularly	n	a	country	such	as	ireland	wth	ts	
consttutonal	dedcaton	to	fundamental	rghts,	ths	s	essental.	The	crmnal	
justce	 system	 should	 concern	 tself	wth	 ts	 falures,	 not	 just	 n	 terms	 of	
convctons	of	nnocent	people,	but	n	how	t	treats	all	ndvduals	who	come	
7.	 Steker	and	Steker	(n	24).
8.	 herbert	packer,	‘Two	Models	of	the	crmnal	process’	(194)	11	U	penn	L	rev	1.
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before	the	system.	any	system	mbued	wth	powers	of	ths	 lk	should	be	so	
concerned. If it does not concern itself in this way, public confidence in the 
system	wll	be	reduced.	in	a	democratc	state	that	clams	to	respect	due	process,	
the	powers	of	the	State	are	exercsed	on	a	mandate	that	the	rghts	of	all	ndvduals	
wll	be	respected,	n	lne	wth	the	presumpton	of	nnocence.	a	state	that	fals	n	
ths	regard	cannot	clam	to	have	adhered	to	ths	mandate	and	so	mscarrages	of	
justce	strke	at	the	core	of	the	State’s	capacty	to	govern	over	all	ctzens,	not	
just	those	who	have	suffered	drectly	as	a	result	of	the	mscarrage.9	further,	
we	subscrbe	to	the	vew,	outlned	above,	that	cases	of	nnocence	may	not	be	the	
most	serous	n	a	system.	it	s,	we	contend,	normatvely	worse	from	a	systematc	
perspective that a police officer frames an individual who cannot later prove 
nnocence	 than	a	wtness	wrongly	 dentfyng	an	 ndvdual	wthout	malce.	
Limiting the definition to cases of innocence is, we contend, detrimental to 
the criminal justice system. The definition should include cases where justice 
has	not	been	carred	out,	.e.	where	fundamental	rghts	have	been	breached	to	
secure	a	convcton.	
in	 terms	of	 how	 such	breaches	may	manfest	 themselves,	 t	 s	 accepted	
nternatonally	that	there	are	sx	key	causes	of	wrongful	convcton:	polce	and	
prosecutorial misconduct; false eyewitness identification; false confession; junk 
scence;	 neffectve	assstance	of	counsel;	and	nformant	 testmony.40	where	
any of these occur, we find that the ‘carriage of justice’ has been disrupted, and 
thus,	that	the	legtmacy	of	the	convcton	and	any	faled	appeals	requres	re-
examnaton.	for	example,	confesson	evdence	s	regularly	reled	upon	at	tral.	
if	t	were	establshed	after	the	normal	appeals	process	was	exhausted	that	ths	
evdence	was	obtaned	as	a	result	of	polce	brutalty	and	ntmdaton,	ths	would	
mert	revstng.	Smlarly,	f	t	appears	after	the	appeals	process	that	testmony	of	
a	probatve	wtness	s	unrelable,	for	example	where	a	wtness	perjured	herself,	
we	must	accept	that	the	carrage	of	justce	was	dsrupted,	and	the	system	must	
allow	for	ths	wrong	to	be	put	rght.	The	artcle	wll	now	move	to	consder	how	
varous	jursdctons	have	attempted	to	address	ths	dlemma.
III. InTernaTIonal aPProaches
A difficulty for comparative purposes is that while many countries have dealt 
wth	mechansms	that	permt	the	revstng	of	possble	mscarrages	of	justce,	
few	have	consdered	what	actually	consttutes	a	mscarrage	of	justce	n	legal	
terms.	in	realty	ths	solely	becomes	an	ssue	when	a	person	seeks	compensaton,	
as	 convctons	 can	be	quashed,	overturned	or	 revsted	wthout	 reference	 to	
9.	 See	davd	Beetham,	The Legitimation of Power	(MacMllan	1991)	for	a	dscusson	of	
the	legtmate	use	of	power.	
40.	 robert	Schehr,	‘The	crmnal	cases	revew	commsson	as	a	State	Strategc	Selecton	
Mechansm’	(2005)	42	amercan	crmnal	L	rev	1289.		
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ths	term.	The	delay	n	addressng	these	ssues	s	renforced	by	human	rghts	
nstruments	where	the	ssue	of	mscarrages	of	justce	arse	only	n	relaton	to	
an	enttlement	to	compensaton,	where	t	can	be	shown	that	one	has	occurred,	
though again no definition has been provided.41	here,	we	wll	 revew	 the	
definition in a range of countries. To remedy the shortfall of information we will 
also	consder	the	grounds	on	whch	a	case	can	be	revsted	after	the	standard	
appeals	procedure,	as	n	many	cases	ths	s	hghly	ndcatve	of	how	a	country	
would legally define the term. 
in	new	South	wales	the	dna	revew	panel	consders	clams	of	nnocence	
and where satisfied can refer the case to the Court of Appeal for reconsideration.42	
These claims relate solely to DNA evidence and the definition is not just limited 
to	nnocence,	but	nnocence	establshed	by	a	partcular	form	of	evdence.	South	
australa	has	recently	ntroduced	a	bll	to	establsh	a	crmnal	case	revew	
commsson	(ccrc).	at	present	the	only	remedy	s	for	an	ndvdual	to	petton	
the	attorney	General,	who	has	the	power	to	refer	the	case	to	the	full	court.4	
Similar provisions exist throughout Australia but South Australia is the first to 
move	toward	a	verson	of	the	ccrc.	The	proposals,	however,	do	not	make	any	
reference	to	the	term	at	all	so	t	s	most	unclear	how	that	body	wll	ntegrate	wth	
ths	debate.	despte	australa	beng	sgnatory	to	the	iccpr	there	s	no	common	
law	or	statutory	rght	to	compensaton.	States	or	terrtores	may	choose	to	make	
an	ex gratia	payment.	There	are	no	gudelnes	n	relaton	to	ths	payment.	The	
australan	captal	Terrtory	 has	 enshrned	 a	 rght	 to	 compensaton	 through	
secton	2	of	the	human	rghts	act	2004,	but	t	s	unclear	as	yet	how	the	term	
will be defined. New South Wales, then, is in effect the only territory to give 
any	clarty	and	t	has	a	strong	nnocence-based	concepton	of	the	term.
in	new	Zealand	the	payment	of	compensaton	s	lmted	to	cases	where	an	
ndvdual	can	establsh	that	they	are	nnocent	on	the	balance	of	probabltes.44	
however,	 there	 s	 scope	 for	 an	 ndvdual	 to	 argue	 that	 extraordnary	
crcumstances	 exst,	whch	 show	 that	 t	 s	 n	 the	 nterests	 of	 justce	 to	 pay	
compensaton.	Mathas	has	argued	that	‘the	gudelnes	are	not,	therefore,	unduly	
concerned	wth	falure	to	compensate	people	who	are	really	nnocent,	and	they	
are	arguably	over-concerned	wth	avodng	compensatng	people	who	are	really	
gulty’.45	payments	are	made	on	an	ex gratia	bass	and	so	are	dscretonary	n	
nature.	hong	kong	also	operates	an	ex gratia	payments	system	whereby	there	s	
no	general	enttlement.	compensaton	‘s	payable’	(.e.	there	s	no	rght)	where	
41.	 art		protocol	7	echr;	art	14()	iccpr.	
42.	 crmes	(appeal	and	revew)	act	2001,	s	90.
4.	 crmnal	Law	consoldaton	act	195,	s	9.
44.	 Law	commsson	of	new	Zealand,	‘compensatng	 the	wrongly	convcted’	(1998)	
paper	49.
45.	 donald	Mathas	(2011),	commentary	on	compensaton	for	wrongful	convctons:	
<http://www.nzcriminallaw.blogspot.co.uk/2011/05/compensation-for-wrongful-
convctons.html>	accessed	24	May	2012.
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a	new	fact	shows	‘conclusvely	that	there	has	been	a	mscarrage	of	justce’.	
Again, the term is not defined.4	
in	amerca	we	can	note	a	number	of	developments.	frst,	the	focus	has	often	
centred	on	bodes	that	consder	the	causes	of	mscarrages	of	justce	rather	than	
bodes	lke	the	ccrc,	to	whch	ndvduals	can	apply.	innocence	commssons,	
as	they	are	called,	have	now	been	establshed	n	11	states.	The	name	ndcates	
qute	clearly	an	assocaton	between	mscarrages	of	justce	and	nnocence.	More	
recently,	prosecutors	n	a	number	of	states	have	set	up	what	are	called	ether	
convcton	 integrty	Unts	or	 Justce	revew	panels,	 but	 agan	 these	centre	
on	dna	evdence	of	nnocence.	at	a	federal	level	the	Justce	for	all	act	2004	
contans	the	innocence	protecton	act,47	whch	provdes	a	rght	of	dna	testng	
n	support	of	a	clam	of	nnocence.48	perhaps	most	tellngly,	compensaton	laws,	
whch	now	exst	at	a	federal	level	and	n	27	states,	requre	that	the	ndvdual	
has	been	deemed	nnocent,	and	n	fact	occasonally	go	so	far	as	to	state	that	the	
ndvdual	s	not	enttled	to	compensaton	f	they	contrbuted	to	ther	wrongful	
convcton,	whch	could	nclude	havng	made	a	false	confesson.49	in	terms	of	
the	iccpr,	amerca	entered	a	reservaton	to	artcle	14(),	effectvely	statng	
that	t	does	not	recognse	a	rght	to	compensaton,	the	only	country	to	make	
such	a	statement.50
wthn	the	canadan	department	of	Justce	there	s	a	dedcated	crmnal	
convcton	 revew	 Group	 that	 consders	 applcatons	 and	 can	 make	
recommendatons	to	the	Mnster	for	Justce,	who	determnes	what	acton	should	
be	taken.51	at	that	pont	the	process	outlnes	that	the	ndvdual	does	not	have	to	
prove	nnocence	but	must	show	reason	to	beleve	that	a	mscarrage	of	justce,	
undefined, may have occurred. Again, however, when it comes to compensation, 
nnocence	s	requred.	whle	legslaton	has	not	been	enacted,	each	provnce	
has	ntroduced	gudelnes	for	the	payment	of	compensaton	for	mscarrages	of	
justce	and	these	are	based	on	the	premse	that	an	ndvdual	has	been	convcted	
of	a	crme	they	dd	not	commt.52	
france	has	a	specal	procedure	called	pourvoi en revision,	whch	permts	
applications for a new trial following a final verdict. Under Article 622 of the 
4.	 for	further	dscusson,	see	Jason	costa,	‘alone	n	the	world:	The	Unted	States’	falure	
to	observe	the	internatonal	human	rght	to	compensaton	for	wrongful	convcton’	
(2005)	19	emory	int’l	L	rev	115.
47.	 Ttle	iV	of	the	Justce	for	all	act	2004.	
48.	 s	411.
49.	 for	a	thorough	dscusson	of	compensaton	laws	n	the	Unted	States	see	adele	Bernhard,	
‘Justce	Stll	fals:	a	revew	of	recent	efforts	to	compensate	indvduals	who	have	
Been	Unjustly	convcted	and	Later	exonerated’	(200–2004)	52	drake	L	rev	70.
50.	 for	a	further	dscusson,	see	costa	(n	4).
51.	 for	an	overvew	of	the	process	n	canada,	see	campbell	(n	5).
52. For instance, see the guidelines for the State of Ontario: <http://www.
attorneygeneral.jus.gov.on.ca/englsh/about/pubs/truscott/secton5.asp>	accessed	1	
May	2012.
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code	of	crmnal	procedure	such	a	petton	can	be	made	for	serous	cases	where	
new	facts	rase	a	doubt	as	to	the	gult	of	the	ndvdual.	So	whle	nnocence	
need	not	be	proven,	the	am	s	drected	towards	the	accuracy	of	the	convcton,	
rather	than	the	proprety	of	the	tral.5	in	israel	secton	1	of	the	court	Law	
was	amended	n	1995	to	permt	a	further	revew	where	real	suspcon	exsts	
that there has been a miscarriage of justice. The terms are undefined, and while 
rattner	has	argued	that	t	could	be	a	‘wde	basket’	the	realty	s	that	the	courts	
have	exonerated	just	two	persons	from	85	requests,	leadng	to	the	concluson	
that	there	s	‘a	great	deal	of	unwllngness	to	admt	ts	own	errors	to	an	extent	
that	makes	some	wonder	about	the	sanctty	of	the	crmnal	law’.54
in	the	Uk,	applcatons	are	made	to	a	crmnal	case	revew	commsson	that	
determnes	whether	or	not	new	evdence	rases	questons	as	to	the	safety	of	the	
convcton.	The	ccrc,	followng	a	revew	of	the	case,	makes	recommendatons	
to	the	court	of	appeal	on	whether	or	not	the	court	should	reconsder	the	case.55	
The	court	of	appeal	can	quash	the	convcton	and	the	ndvdual	then	has	to	
apply	to	 the	Secretary	of	State	for	an	order	of	compensaton	where	he	feels	
there has been a miscarriage of justice. Despite difficulties with resourcing, the 
ccrc	has	been	lauded	nternatonally	as	an	ndependent	body	that	assesses	
clams	of	mscarrages	of	justce.5	as	of	1	March	2012,	21	convctons	have	
been	quashed	by	the	court	of	appeal	followng	referrals	from	the	ccrc.57	The	
jursprudence	has	emerged	 from	 judcal	 revews	of	 the	Secretary	of	State’s	
decson.	The	leadng	case	untl	 last	year	was	Mullen,58	where	 the	house	of	
Lords	presented	opposng	vews	on	ths	ssue,	wth	Lord	Bngham	takng	a	wde	
vew	(the	ndvdual	should	not	have	been	convcted	at	tral)	and	Lord	Steyn	
restrctng	t	to	cases	of	demonstrable	nnocence.	
in	McCartney and McDermott59	 the	Supreme	court	 consdered	 n	detal	
the	meanng	of	mscarrage	of	justce	to	be	appled	by	the	Secretary	of	State	n	
making a decision as to compensation. The new definition goes further than the 
Mullen	concepton	of	nnocence	and	centres	on	the	fresh	evdence	presented:
a	new	fact	wll	 show	 that	a	mscarrage	of	 justce	has	occurred	when	
t	so	undermnes	the	evdence	aganst	the	defendant	that	no conviction 
5.	 See	generally	dongos	(n	4).
54. Ayre Rattner, ‘The Sanctity of the Criminal Law: Thoughts and Reflections on Wrongful 
convcton	n	israel’	n	huff	and	kllas	(eds)	(n	4).
55.	 regulated	by	ss	9–14	of	the	crmnal	appeal	act	1995.	
5. For an examination of the work of the Commission over its first ten years, see Laurie 
elks,	Righting Miscarriages of Justice? Ten Years of the Criminal Case Review 
Commission (Justce	2008).
57.	 Ths	s	out	of	40	applcatons	to	the	court	and	a	total	of	almost	14,000	cases	completed	
by the Commission. Data available on Department of Justice website <http://www.
justce.gov.uk/about/crmnal-cases-revew-commsson>	accessed	1	May	2012.
58.	 R v Secretary of State ex parte Mullen	[2004]	UkhL	18.
59.	 R (Adams) v Secretary of State ex parte McCartney, MacDermott [2011]	UkSc	18.
2012]	 What is a Miscarriage of Justice?	 15
could possibly be based upon it.	Ths	 s	 a	matter	 to	whch	 the	 test	 of	
satsfacton	beyond	 reasonable	doubt	 can	 readly	be	 appled.	Ths	 test	
wll	not	guarantee	that	all	those	who	are	enttled	to	compensaton	are	n	
fact	nnocent.	it	wll,	however,	ensure	that	when	nnocent	defendants	are	
convcted	on	evdence	whch	 s	 subsequently	dscredted,	 they	are	not	
precluded	from	obtanng	compensaton	because	they	cannot	prove	ther	
nnocence	beyond	reasonable	doubt.0	
Ths	approach	s	motvated	by	a	concern	that	not	all	of	those	who	are	nnocent	can	
prove that fact, while accepting that, inevitably, the approach will benefit others. 
it	does	not	appear	to	go	so	far	as	sayng	that	when	a	fundamental	rght	has	been	
breached a miscarriage of justice has occurred. However, when this definition 
was	appled	to	the	cases	concerned	ths	was	the	effect	t	had.	Both	Mccartney	
and	Macdermott	were	convcted	solely	on	 the	bass	of	confesson	evdence	
they	had	contnually	contested,	mantanng	that	the	confessons	were	forced	
by	ll-treatment	or	were	concocted.	Ther	convctons	were	overturned	when	the	
evdence	relatng	to	the	ll-treatment	was	re-evaluated	and	the	confessons	were	
deemed to be unsafe. The Supreme Court here ruled that these cases satisfied 
the definition of miscarriage of justice proposed. This had nothing to do with 
whether	or	not	the	applcants	were	nnocent,	but	as	Lord	phllps	stated:
n	the	lght	of	the	newly	dscovered	facts	…	these	were	proceedngs	that	
ought	not	to	have	been	brought	because	the	evdence	aganst	them	has	
been	 so	 completely	 undermned	 that	 no	 convcton	 could	 possbly	 be	
based	upon	t.1
equally	Lord	kerr	held	 that	 t	was	not	smply	the	case	 that	 they	should	not	
have been convicted, but they should never have been prosecuted in the first 
place.	So	t	s	clear	that	f	the	evdence	s	such	that	the	prosecuton	should	not	
have occurred in the first place, this will be considered a miscarriage of justice 
n	the	Uk.	
This review identifies four possible approaches that have been adopted 
elsewhere to defining miscarriages of justice. First, Israel has not addressed or 
defined the term. Second, a range of countries, such as New Zealand, America, 
france,	canada	and	possbly	australa	requre	nnocence	(establshed	to	varyng	
levels)	n	order	for	the	case	to	be	consdered	a	mscarrage	of	justce.	Thrd,	
new	Zealand	also	contans	a	further	category	where	extraordnary	crcumstances	
suggest	that	compensaton	should	be	payable	n	the	nterests	of	justce.	whle	
not	phrased	n	terms	of	mscarrages	of	justce,	gven	that	ths	arses	n	such	
cases,	ths	at	least	mples	a	recognton	that	lmtng	the	term	to	nnocence	may	
not	always	be	just.	fnally,	the	Uk,	through	the	Supreme	court,	has	adopted	a	
0.	 bd,	Lord	phllps,	[55]	(emphass	added).
1.	 bd,	Lord	phllps,	[11].
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broader	approach	that	consders	whether	a	convcton	could	possbly	be	based	
on	the	evdence.	The	second	and	thrd	optons	clearly	recognse	the	due	process	
concerns. The review has also identified a number of countries that have yet 
to	address	ths	thorny	ssue	and	for	whom	ths	work	may	be	nstructve.	Ths	
artcle	wll	now	turn	to	consder	how	the	irsh	legslature	and	superor	courts	
have	addressed	the	ssue,	begnnng	wth	a	consderaton	of	the	legal	poston	
before 1993 when the first statutory scheme was introduced. 
IV. The DIlemma In IrelanD
in	ireland,	pror	to	199,	the	only	avenue	for	redress	was	to	seek	a	presdental	
pardon.	The	presdent	 s	 granted	 a	 power	 of	 pardon	 under	art	 1.	 of	 the	
consttuton.	Unlke	the	Unted	States	presdent,	who	has	broad	dscreton	to	
grant	pardons,2	the	irsh	presdent	grants	such	pardons	‘on	the	advce	of	the	
government’,	a	consttutonally	polte	way	of	provdng	that	the	presdent	can	
only	grant	a	pardon	where	nstructed	to	by	the	government.	
The	presdental	power	of	pardon	has	only	been	exercsed	on	three	occasons	
n	the	State:	n	1940	for	Thomas	Qunn,	n	194	for	walter	Brady,	and	for	
ncky	kelly,	who	was	convcted	n	the	1978	for	the	Sallns	Mal	Tran	robbery,	
alongsde	 three	 other	men.4	whle	 hs	 co-defendants	were	 acqutted,	kelly	
was	only	released	n	1984	followng	a	hunger	strke	and	a	substantal	publc	
campagn.	 in	 1992	he	was	granted	 a	 presdental	 pardon	 and	 awarded	over	
£750,000	n	compensaton.5	
The	effect	of	a	pardon	s	unclear;	whether	t	s	to	smply	releve	the	ndvdual	
of	the	punshments	attachng	to	the	convcton,	or	whether	t	replaces	a	verdct	
of	gulty	wth	not	gulty.7	in	1990,	a	commttee	of	enqury	n	ireland	concluded	
that	the	effect	s	to	negatve	gult	and	blame,	concludng:	‘it	seems	to	us	that	the	
2. President Clinton, for example, granted 200 pardons in his last days in office, as did 
George	w	Bush	n	the	same	perod.	perhaps	most	controversally,	n	1974	presdent	ford	
pardoned	former	presdent	nxon	for	hs	actons	that	led	to	the	watergate	scandal.
. Both cases cited by Deputy O’Donnell, Dáil Debates vol 436, col 901.
4.	 People (DPP) v Kelly	[1982]	ir	90	(cca).	See	generally	patsy	McGarry,	When Justice 
Slept: Nicky Kelly and the True Story Behind the Sallins Mail Train Robbery (Lffey	
press	200).
5. That compensation was paid was confirmed by the Minister for Justice in 1993; see 
Dáil Debates 7 October 1993, vol 434, col 461. The amount was not confirmed by the 
government	but	n	hs	book,	McGarry	(bd	242)	ndcated	that	t	was	almost	£1	mllon	
ncludng	costs.
.	 in	R v Foster	[1985]	QB	115	(ca)	the	court	held	that	the	power	of	pardon	does	not	
nclude	a	power	to	set	asde	a	convcton.	
7.	 in	the	Unted	States	case	of	ex parte Garland 71	US		(18)	the	Supreme	court	
held	that	the	power	of	pardon	‘releases	the	punshment	and	blots	out	of	exstence	the	
gult’.		
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effect	of	a	pardon	n	such	terms	s	to	clear	the	person	from	all	nfamy.’8	in	an	
earler	report,	however,	t	was	argued	that	the	term	‘pardon’	was	not	approprate	
n	the	context	of	a	mscarrage	of	justce,	as
t	suggests	that	he	had	done	somethng	for	whch	a	pardon	was	needed	and	
that	a	pardon,	unlke	a	retral	and	acquttal,	does	not	conclusvely	establsh	
the	legal	nnocence	of	the	person	concerned	nor	make	the	convcton	vod	
ab initio.9
it	would	appear	that	n	an	irsh	context	at	least,	the	effect	of	a	pardon	s	dependent	
on	the	termnology	of	the	pardon	tself:	t	may	smply	dscharge	the	ndvdual	
of	penaltes	ncurred	on	foot	of	a	convcton,70	or	may	go	so	far	as	to	pronounce,	
as	those	early	pardons	dd,	that	the	ndvdual	‘dd	not	commt	and	had	no	part	
or	lot	n	the	commsson	of	the	crme	wth	whch	he	was	charged’.71	it	does	not	
thereby	provde	clear	relef	for	a	person	who	beleves	they	have	been	subject	
to	a	mscarrage	of	justce.	further,	relance	on	ths	approach	would,	accordng	
to	Mcdowell,	 rase	 serous	 questons	 for	 the	 consttutonal	 doctrne	 of	 the	
separaton	of	powers:
crmnal	convctons	are	not	private	rghts:	they	are	adjudcatons	of	a	
publc	knd.	if	the	consttuton	permts	the	publc,	through	the	executve,	
to	solemnly	surrender,	or	abandon,	a	court	order	of	a	publc	knd	convctng	
someone	 of	 crme,	 and	 permts,	 n	 so	 dong,	 that	 the	 convct	 should	
thereafter	be	regarded	n	publc	as	though	he	had	never	been	convcted,	
what	affront	s	there	to	the	courts,	the	judcary,	or	the	admnstraton	of	
justce?72
other	 problems	 lmt	 the	 remedyng	 mpact	 of	 the	 pardon.	 it	 s	 a	 hghly	
naccessble	mechansm,	relyng	on	the	government	to	take	acton	on	the	case,	
whch	presumably	would	requre	substantal	publc	dsquet.	in	ncky	kelly’s	
8.	 Report of Committee to Enquire into Certain Aspects of Criminal Procedure	(Statonery	
Office Dublin 1990) 18.
9.	 Report of the Attorney General’s Committee on the Constitution	 (198)	 as	 quoted	
from	n	Gerard	hogan	and	Gerry	whyte,	Kelly: The Irish Constitution	(4th	edn,	Tottel	
publshng	200)	21. 
70.	 The	language	used	n	the	194	pardon	was	‘that	he	shall	henceforth	stand	released	and	
discharged from all penalties, forfeitures, and disqualifications incident to or consequent 
on	hs	sad	convcton	…	as	f	he	had	not	been	so	charged	or	convcted’.	
71.	 These	were	the	terms	used	n	the	presdental	pardon	n	1940	of	Thomas	Qunn,	Report 
of Committee to Enquire into Certain Aspects of Criminal Procedure	(n	8)	17.
72.	 Mchael	Mcdowell,	‘pardon:	an	adequate	response	to	injustce?’	(1991)	1(1)	icLJ	1,	
.	in	the	case	of	Brennan	[1995]	1	ir	12	(cca)	the	court	held	that	the	commutaton	
of	punshment	dd	not	amount	to	a	breach	of	the	doctrne	of	separaton	of	powers;	the	
court	dd	not	rule	on	whether	or	not	the	power	encompasses	a	rght	to	restore	nnocence	
to	the	ndvdual.
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case	t	took	nearly	ten	years	and	a	song	by	chrsty	Moore7 to generate sufficient 
maelstrom	for	the	government	to	act.	further,	there	was	no	statutory	rght	to	
compensaton	attachng	to	the	presdental	pardon.	compensaton	was	granted	
to	ncky	kelly	but	the	awardng	of	compensaton,	ncludng	the	amount,	s	at	
the	dscreton	of	 the	government.	ireland	was	a	sgnatory	at	 ths	 tme	to	the	
iccpr,	artcle	14()	of	whch	requred	the	payment	of	compensaton	to	vctms	
of	mscarrages	of	justce;	however	the	government	had	entered	a	reservaton	
on	ths	partcular	subsecton,	statng	that	payment	of	compensaton	was	at	the	
dscreton	of	the	government.	Ths	reservaton	was	removed	n	1998.	
The	sole	legslatve	reference	to	the	term	at	ths	pont	was	n	the	crmnal	
Justce	act	 1928	whch,	 n	 consderng	 the	 powers	 of	 the	court	 of	appeal,	
stated	that	an	appeal	could	be	dsmssed	by	the	court	‘f	they	consder	that	no	
mscarrage	of	justce	has	actually	occurred’.74	Ths	s	a	negatve	reference	wth	
no definition provided. A review of case law prior to the 1990s shows that a 
number	of	judgments	refer	to	mscarrages	of	justce	but	all	were	n	the	context	
of	the	ordnary	appeals	system	and	resulted	n	the	convcton	beng	overturned.75	
The	case	of	People (AG) v Murtagh	s	perhaps	a	sole	example	of	an	attempt	
to	consder	the	meanng	of	the	phrase.7	There	kenny	J	looked	to	the	englsh	
case	of	R v Bywaters, where	t	was	stated	that	the	term	mscarrage	of	justce	
‘means	that	a	person	has	been	mproperly	found	gulty’.77	The	use	of	the	word	
mproperly	tes	to	the	broader	concepton	of	mscarrages	of	justce	referred	to	
above,	rather	than	one	ted	to	nnocence.	
in	england	and	wales	the	ssue	of	mscarrages	of	justce	came	to	a	head	n	the	
late	1980s	through	the	so-called	‘irsh	cases’.	in	1989	the	Guldford	four	were	
released	after	15	years	n	prson,	and	the	followng	year	both	the	Brmngham	
Sx	 and	 the	Magure	Seven	were	 also	 released.	The	royal	commsson	on	
7.	 The	song	‘The	wcklow	Boy’	concerns	ncky	kelly’s	plght	for	nnocence:	‘Gve	the	
wcklow	Boy	hs	freedom,	gve	hm	back	hs	lberty,	or	are	we	gong	to	leave	hm	n	
the	chans,	whle	those	who	framed	hm	up	hold	the	key?	deprve	of	human	rghts	by	
hs	own	people	sckened	by	the	njustce	he	jumped	bal,	n	the	appalachan	Mountans	
found	a	welcome,	tl	hs	co-accused	were	both	release	from	jal,	he	came	back	expectng	
to get justice, Special Branch took him from the plane, for five years we’ve deprive 
hm	of	hs	freedom,	the	gulty	jeer	the	nnocent	agan.	The	people	versus	kelly	was	the	
ttle	of	the	farce	we	staged	at	hs	appeal,	puppets	n	well	rehearsed	colluson,	i	often	
wonder	how	these	men	must	feel,	as	i	walked	past	portlaose	prson,	Through	concrete	
and	steel	a	whsper	came	“My	frame-up	s	almost	complete,	i’m	nnocent,	ncky	kelly	
s	my	name.”’	from	the	album	The Time Has Come	(wea	198).								
74.	 s	5(1).
75.	 for	example,	People (AG) v Grey	[1944]	1	ir	2	(cca);	People (AG) v Carney and 
Mulcahy	[1955]	ir	24	(Sc);	People (AG) v Marshall	[195]	ir	79	(cca);	People 
(AG) v Flynn	[19]	ir	255	(cca);	People (AG) v O’Loughlin	[1979]	ir	85	(cca).
7.	 [19]	ir	1	(Sc).
77.	 17	cr	app	r	.
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crmnal	Justce	set	up	n	ther	wake	reported	n	19978	and	led	to	the	creaton	
of	the	ccrc	n	1997.79	
in	1989	a	commttee	was	establshed	by	the	irsh	Government	to	determne	
the	 need	 for	 an	 addtonal	 appeals	 procedure,	 due	 to	 concerns	 emergng	
domestcally	followng	those	englsh	cases	mentoned,	as	well	as	the	ncky	kelly	
and	the	kerry	Babes	cases.80	The	Mnster	for	Justce	establshed	a	commttee	
of	inqury	under	Mr	Justce	frank	Martn	to	examne	both	the	need	for	a	system	
of	revewng	alleged	mscarrages	of	justce	and	the	use	of	nculpatory	statements	
n	court.	The	Martn	report,	publshed	n	1990,	determned	that	the	irsh	system	
dd	not	at	that	tme	offer	any	relef	and	so:
in	consequence,	t	seems	to	us	that	to	cater	for	those	rare	cases	n	whch	
substantal	 doubt	 as	 to	 the	 correctness	 of	 a	 convcton	may	 arse,	 the	
concept	of	justce	calls	for	a	procedure	wheren	the	entre	matter,	ncludng	
such	new	evdence	as	may	have	come	to	lght,	may	be	fully	and	publcly	
nvestgated.81
The Committee, which at no point actively defined the term miscarriage of 
justce,	concluded	that	the	establshment	of	‘an	ndependent	body	wth	statutory	
powers	 of	 nqury	 s	 by	 far	 the	most	 effectve	manner	 of	 dealng	wth	 the	
stuaton’.82	Ths	body	would	st	 n	publc,	have	powers	under	the	Trbunals	
of	inqury	act,	consst	of	one	or	more	persons	and	be	n	a	poston	to	appont	
ts	own	counsel	f	so	needed.	The	attorney	General	would	act	as	gatekeeper,	
recevng	 applcatons	 and	makng	 referrals	 to	 the	 body	where	 approprate.	
havng	consdered	the	evdence,	the	Board	of	inqury	would	express	an	opnon	
on	whether	doubt	exsted	‘as	to	the	proprety	of	the	convcton’	on	whch	the	
government	could	decde	what	acton	to	take.8	The	commttee	also	called	for	
statutory	compensaton	for	those	vctms	of	mscarrages	of	justce.	
Three	years	later	the	crmnal	procedure	Bll	199	was	publshed,	whch	
departed	wldly	from	the	Martn	report,	proposng	a	court-based	remedy.84	on	
enactment, the Court of Criminal Appeal was for the first time granted the power 
to	reopen	a	case	whch	t	had	already	decded	where	new	or	newly	dscovered	
facts	ndcated	that	a	mscarrage	of	justce	had	occurred.	To	balance	concerns	
expressed	by	 the	Martn	commttee	 that	 the	evdence	 n	an	appeal	may	not	
78.	 royal	commsson,	Report on Criminal Justice	(cmd	22,	199),	also	known	as	the	
Runciman Report.  
79.	 establshed	n	March	1997	under	part	ii	of	the	crmnal	appeal	act	1995.
80.	 Report of the Inquiry into the ‘Kerry Babies Case’	(n	15).
81.	 Report of Committee to Enquire into Certain Aspects of Criminal Procedure	(n	8)	
10.
82.	 bd	12.
8.	 bd.
84. See the second stage of the debate on the Bill in the Dáil Debates 6 October 1993, vol 
44,	col	9.	
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satsfy	 a	 court,	 alternatve	mechansms,	 ncludng	a	petton	 to	 the	Mnster	
for	Justce,	who	would	not	be	bound	by	the	same	evdental	requrements	as	a	
court,	were	also	created.	
V. crImInal ProceDure acT 1993
The Criminal Procedure Act 1993 for the first time provides a statutory 
mechansm	n	ireland	for	those	who	wsh	to	clam	a	mscarrage	of	justce,	post-
appeal.	Three	mechansms	are	created:	an	applcaton	can	be	made	drectly	to	
the	court	of	appeal,85	the	Mnster	for	Justce	can	be	pettoned	for	a	pardon8	
and	the	Mnster	s	empowered	to	establsh	a	commttee	of	nqury	nto	a	case	to	
determne	f	the	power	to	pardon	should	be	exercsed.87	The	act	also	regulates	
the provision of compensation where a certificate of miscarriage of justice has 
been	granted.88	
Secton	2	 of	 the	crmnal	procedure	act	 199	 states	 that	 a	 person	who	
has	been	convcted	on	ndctment	or	followng	a	gulty	plea89	can,	followng	
appeals,90	apply	to	the	court	of	crmnal	appeal	to	have	hs	sentence	quashed	
where	‘he	alleges	that	a	new	or	newly	dscovered	fact	shows	that	there	has	been	
a	mscarrage	of	justce	n	relaton	to	the	convcton’.	Ths	provdes	an	ndvdual	
wth	drect	access	to	the	court	of	crmnal	appeal	where	he	has	evdence	of	a	
‘new	or	newly	dscovered	fact’.	The	legslaton,	whch	apples	retrospectvely,	
allows	the	court	to	quash	the	convcton	and	order	a	retral	f	t	deems	necessary,	
or quash, confirm or vary the sentence imposed.91 A finding of miscarriage 
of	 justce	 s	not	necessary	 to	 take	 those	actons.	once	 the	suggeston	of	 the	
miscarriage of justice is established sufficiently for the court to hold the hearing 
at	all,	t	then	effectvely	becomes	an	ordnary	appeal	wth	the	addtonal	opton	
for the court to issue a certificate that a miscarriage of justice has occurred. 
Even where a court does find that there may have been faults in the trial process 
and	beleves	that	a	pont	rased	n	the	appeal	mght	be	decded	n	favour	of	the	
appellant, it can confirm the conviction on the basis that it is of the belief that, 
all	thngs	consdered,	no	mscarrage	of	justce	actually	occurred.92	equally	t	
can	quash	the	convcton	and	order	a	retral,	where	the	jury	wll	hear	the	case	
85.	 s	2.	
8.	 s	7.	
87.	 s	8.	
88.	 s	9.
89.	 in	effect	excludng	convctons	from	the	dstrct	court.	persons	convcted	by	the	dstrct	
court	can	have	ther	cases	consdered	under	ss	7	and	8.	
90.	 The	fact	that	a	retral	or	cvl	proceedngs	have	been	held	s	no	bar	to	ths	procedure.	The	
sole	requrement	n	terms	of	other	cases	s	that	there	must	be	no	crmnal	proceedngs	
pendng	n	relaton	to	the	case.
91.	 s	.
92.	 crmnal	procedure	act	199,	s	(1)(a).
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wthout	the	tanted	evdence,9	or	quash	the	convcton	and	substtute	a	verdct	
of	gulty	for	some	other	offence.94	Thus,	merely	establshng	that	there	were	
errors	n	the	ntal	tral	process	does	not	automatcally	gve	rse	to	the	convcton	
beng	quashed	under	secton	(1)(b)	of	the	act.	
Under	 the	 legslaton,	 a	 ‘new	 fact’	means	 a	 fact	 that	was	 known	 to	 the	
convcted	person	at	the	tme	of	the	tral	or	appeal	n	relaton	to	whch	he	can	
reasonably	 explan	 the	 lack	of	 evdence.95	a	 ‘newly	dscovered	 fact’	 s	 one	
that	was	dscovered,	or	came	to	the	notce	of	the	convcted	person,	after	the	
appeal	proceedngs.9	it	could	also	be	a	fact	that	he	knew	at	the	tme	but	dd	
not appreciate the significance of. The first step taken by the Court of Criminal 
appeal	when	an	applcaton	s	made	under	secton	2	s	to	determne	whether	
either such fact exists. Once satisfied of that, the case then proceeds as any other 
appeal. The definition of these terms – new and newly discovered facts – as 
well	as	the	relatonshp	between	them	and	a	mscarrage	of	justce,	has	been	
heavly	ltgated	n	the	irsh	courts.97	however,	these	ssues	are	not	the	focus	
of	ths	artcle.	our	concern	s	to	track	the	evoluton	of	the	term	mscarrage	of	
justce	n	irsh	law.	
Before	movng	to	ths,	a	bref	word	on	how	compensaton	s	secured.	whle	
the	quashng	of	a	convcton	may	be	a	satsfactory	outcome	for	some	applcants,	
others	seek	compensaton.	Secton	9	of	the	199	act	provdes	that	where	the	
Court of Criminal Appeal certifies that a miscarriage of justice occurred, the 
Mnster	for	Justce	s	requred	to	authorse	payment.	The	act	s	not	entrely	
clear on the circumstances in which a certificate will be issued, the procedure 
for	ssuance,	nor	whether	the	court	 s	oblged	to	do	so	once	a	convcton	s	
quashed.	Ths	ssue	arose	n	Pringle.98
here,	the	court	of	crmnal	appeal	quashed	the	convcton	of	the	appellant,	
but refused his application for a certificate that the newly discovered fact gave 
rse	to	a	mscarrage	of	justce.	Blayney	J	n	the	Supreme	court	bluntly	stated	
that	smply	because	a	convcton	s	quashed	as	beng	unsafe	does	not	enttle	
the applicant to a certificate. Lynch J noted that a primary condition of section 
9(1)(a)()	s	that	‘all	crmnal	proceedngs	n	relaton	to	the	offence	of	whch	the	
9.	 s	(1)(c).
94.	 s	(1)(d).
95.	 s	2().
9.	 s	2(4).	whle	the	act	dfferentates	between	a	new	and/or	newly	dscovered	fact	n	
s 2, it rather confusingly goes on to conflate them in ss 7 and 9. In People (DPP) v 
Shortt (No 2)	[2002]	2	ir	9	the	court	of	crmnal	appeal	conclusvely	stated	that	
no	dstncton	should	be	drawn.
97.	 See,	among	other	cases,	People (DPP) v McDonagh	[199]	1	ir	05	(cca);	DPP v 
Michael Joseph Kelly	(20009)	iecca	5;	and	DPP v Gannon	[1997]	ir	40	(cca).	
for	a	detaled	dscusson	of	ths	area	see	Vcky	conway,	yvonne	daly	and	Jennfer	
Schweppe,	 Irish Criminal Justice: Theory, Practice and Procedure	 (clarus	press	
2010)	ch	14.
98.	 [1997]	2	ir	225	(cca).	
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applicant was convicted have finally concluded with an acquittal’.99	followng	
ths	declaraton,	the	applcant	then	apples	to	the	court	of	crmnal	appeal	for	
t	to	certfy	that	a	mscarrage	of	justce	occurred	n	the	case.100	The	burden	of	
proof	at	ths	pont,	the	court	found,	s	on	the	applcant	to	show	that	a	mscarrage	
of	justce	occurred	n	the	case	under	the	procedure	n	secton	9(1)(a)().	Lynch	
J	stated:
The	 stage	 has	 been	 reached	where	 the	matter	 s	 no	 longer	 a	 crmnal	
matter	at	all:	 t	 s	now	a	cvl	clam	arsng	out	of	completed	crmnal	
matters	and	the	applcant	s	an	applcant	or	a	plantff	for	cvl	relef	of	a	
monetary	nature.101
The	burden	of	proof	that	rests	on	the	plantff	s	thereby	the	cvl	one,	and	thus	
the	applcant	must	show	that	a	newly	dscovered	fact	shows	that	there	has	been	
a	mscarrage	of	justce	n	the	case.102	Unfortunate	confuson	could	clearly	arse	
were	the	courts	to	use	the	term	‘mscarrage	of	justce’	as	a	term	of	art,	but	clear	
analyss	of	ts	meanng	has	been	provded,	and	t	s	to	ths	that	we	now	turn.	
VI. an IrIsh answer To an InTernaTIonal Problem
The Criminal Procedure Act 1993 does not provide a definition for the term 
‘mscarrage	 of	 justce’	 and	 so	 t	 has	 been	 for	 the	 courts	 to	 determne	 ts	
interpretation. The Dáil debates on the Bill do not provide illumination on the 
matter.	whle	the	meanng	of	terms	such	as	pardon	and	newly	dscovered	fact	
were	consdered	by	the	house	n	detal,	no	queston	s	rased	as	to	what	cases	
exactly	fall	under	the	umbrella	of	mscarrage	of	justce.	presentng	the	Bll	to	
the House, Minister for Justice Máire Geoghegan-Quinn spoke of cases where 
‘the	 verdct	may	have	 been	 unjust’10	 and	where	 there	 s	 evdence	 ‘castng	
substantal	doubt	on	the	correctness	of	a	convcton’.104	These	statements	could	
support	a	broad	nterpretaton	of	the	term	mscarrage	of	justce.	That	sad,	the	
99.	 bd	242.
100.	 s	9(1)(a)().	Blayney	J	argued	that	t	s	mportant	to	dfferentate	the	two	applcatons,	
argung,	‘f	the	term	“mscarrage	of	justce”	were	held	to	apply	to	the	applcant’s	case,	
the	applcant	would	be	enttled	to	compensaton.	if	the	term	were	to	be	construed	n	ths	
way,	the	result	would	n	my	opnon	be	to	prefer	unfarly	an	applcant	who	succeeded	
n	havng	hs	convcton	quashed	because	of	a	newly-dscovered	fact	over	an	applcant	
whose	convcton	was	quashed	on	some	other	ground.’	bd	25.
101.	 bd	244–45.
102.	 bd	245.	Ths	was	reterated	n	DPP v Nevin [2010]	iecca	10,	where	hardman	J	
observed	that	the	applcant	should	smply	prove	on	the	balance	of	probabltes	that	a	
miscarriage of justice occurred in order to secure a certificate. 
10. Dáil Debates vol 434, col 398.
104.	 bd	col	428.
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Mnster	also	stated,	‘one	of	the	faults	of	our	present	system	s	that	the	court	
of	crmnal	appeal	has	no	power	to	reopen	an	appeal	already	decded,	even	
where	clear	evdence	pontng	to	nnocence	comes	to	lght.’105	She	also	stated,	
‘Socety	had	every	reason	to	be	outraged	when	a	mscarrage	of	justce	results	
n	an	nnocent	person	servng	a	prson	sentence.’10	
The	ssue	was	not	rased	n	substance	by	the	opposton	but	references	can	
be	 found	 n	 general	 dscussons	 to	 cases	where	 nnocent	 persons	 had	 been	
wrongfully	convcted.107	deputy	Glmore	spoke	of	‘the	dreadful	damage	that	
can	be	done	to	the	lves	of	nnocent	people	by	mscarrages	of	justce,	nnocent	
people	taken	away	from	ther	famles,	locked	up	under	the	harshest	of	condtons	
for	almost	20	years	for	crmes	they	dd	not	commt’.108	equally,	deputy	Boylan	
told	the	house,	‘nobody	wshes	to	see	a	mscarrage	of	justce	whereby	a	person	
s	jaled	for	a	crme	he	or	she	dd	not	commt.’109	from	readng	the	debate	one	
could	surmse	that	the	government	and	opposton	poltcans	understood	the	
term	to	mean	nnocent	persons	who	had	been	wrongfully	convcted.	But	wthout	
drect	dscusson	of	the	meanng	of	the	term	there	s	no	useful	statement	that	
the	judcary	could	draw	on	n	nterpretng	the	term.	
The	ssue	came	to	a	head	qute	quckly	n	the	courts,	gven	the	retrospectve	
applcaton	of	the	legslaton.	in	1995	appeals	were	lodged	n	two	cases,	those	
of	Meleady	 and	Grogan,	 and	peter	prngle.	The	 case	of	DPP v Meleady,110	
colloqually	known	as	the	case	of	‘the	Tallaght	Two’,	nvolved	the	theft	of	a	
car	by	a	number	of	youths	from	the	owner’s	drveway.	havng	wtnessed	the	
ncdent,	the	owner	jumped	on	the	bonnet	of	the	car	whle	t	was	movng,	where	
he	remaned	untl	the	front	seat	passenger	knocked	hm	off.	The	owner	and	hs	
son later identified the two defendants in the District Court. Both defendants were 
convicted and received five-year sentences. A retrial was later ordered subsequent 
to	clams	by	a	 thrd	party,	who	admtted	beng	 n	 the	vehcle,	 that	Meleady	
was	not	n	the	front	seat	of	the	car	durng	the	ncdent.	on	retral,	however,	the	
defence	lawyer	faled	to	rase	ths	ssue	or	to	call	the	accused	to	testfy	despte	
hs	contnued	denal	of	beng	n	the	car.	Both	were	reconvcted	and	sentenced	to	
imprisonment. In 1990 a television documentary revealed fingerprint evidence 
that had not been disclosed at trial, confirming that another passenger in the car 
had	been	n	the	front	seat.	The	fact	that	a	forensc	examnaton	of	the	car	had	
been	conducted	was	never	dsclosed	to	the	defence.	at	ths	pont	the	Mnster	
for	Justce	remtted	the	remander	of	the	sentences	to	be	served:	seven	months	
for	Meleady	and	nothng	for	Grogan,	who	had	by	then	been	released.	followng	
the	passng	of	the	199	act,	both	appled	to	the	court	of	crmnal	appeal	on	the	
105.	 bd	col	428.
10.	 bd	col	44.	
107.	 See,	for	nstance,	bd	col	454.	
108.	 bd	col	41.
109.	 bd	col	474.
110.	 [1995]	2	ir	517	(cca).
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grounds	that	ther	convctons	amounted	to	mscarrages	of	justce.	
prngle	had	been	convcted	n	1980	of	the	murder	of	a	garda,	at	the	tme	a	
captal	offence.	hs	convcton	was	based	solely	on	confesson	evdence	that	he	
dened	ever	makng.	havng	establshed	that	hs	confesson	had	been	wrtten	by	
the police officer prior to his interrogation, Pringle’s conviction was quashed.111	
He then applied for a certificate of a miscarriage of justice. Both applications 
were	heard	n	the	court	of	crmnal	appeal	n	1995,	went	to	the	Supreme	court	
in 1997 and were finally resolved in the Court of Criminal Appeal in 2001.
in	the	orgnal	applcaton	to	the	court	of	crmnal	appeal	n	Meleady,	the	
Court declined to define a miscarriage of justice and instead spoke of the term 
n	ths	way:
[T]he	mschef	whch	ths	 legslaton	was	desgned	to	remedy	was	not	
smply	the	non-dsclosure	to	the	court	of	tral	of	facts	whch,	f	avalable,	
would	have	conclusvely	demonstrated	the	nnocence	of	the	accused.	it	
was	also	to	provde	redress,	htherto	not	avalable,	n	cases	where	facts	
came to light for the first time after the appeal to this Court which showed 
that	there	mght	have	been	a	mscarrage	of	justce.	112
Much like the initial Dáil debates, the issue is mentioned but not discussed 
substantively. A more developed approach was presented in the first application 
of	peter	prngle,	months	later.	o’flaherty	J	stated:
where	t	s	establshed	that	the	applcant	was	nnocent	of	any	nvolvement	
in the crime alleged that would provide ample justification for the granting 
of a certificate. Further, for example, if in a given case the court were 
to	reach	the	concluson	that	a	convcton	had	resulted	n	a	case	where	a	
prosecuton	should	never	have	been	brought	n	the	sense	that	there	was	no	
credble	evdence	mplcatng	the	applcant,	that	would	be	a	case	where	
a certificate most likely should issue.11
More obliquely, in stating that the Court was obliged to make a positive finding 
of	a	mscarrage	of	justce,	o’flaherty	J	stated	that	ths	means	‘that	the	accused	
was improperly found guilty in the sense that that finding should not, in the 
crcumstances	as	ultmately	found,	have	been	open	to	the	court’.114	Speakng	
n	 general	 terms	 then	 the	court	 suggests	 that	 nnocence,	 a	 scenaro	where	
the prosecution should never have been brought in the first place, or that the 
finding should not have been open to the court to make, may be grounds for 
a	mscarrage	of	justce	beng	declared.	whle	ths	should	not	be	nterpreted	
111.	 People (DPP) v Pringle,	1	May	1995	(cca).
112.	 [1997]	2	ir	517,	542	(cca).
11.	 People (DPP) v Pringle (No 2)	[1997]	2	ir	225	(cca).
114.	 bd	22.
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as indicating specific grounds on which such a claim should be made, it does 
ndcate	that	the	court	certanly	beleved	that	the	term	was	not	lmted	to	cases	
where	 nnocence	 could	 be	 establshed.	 in	 the	 case	 at	 hand	prngle	was	 not	
entitled to a certificate as, in the Court’s view, the findings of the trial court were 
justified on the basis of the evidence that was presented to them. No mention is 
made	of	how	ths	evdence	came	to	exst.	So	where	there	s	a	confesson,	whch	
may be very difficult to contest in the absence of audio-visual recording, thus 
makng	t	arguably	credble,	there	appears	to	be	lttle	room	for	argung	that	ths	
was falsified or secured by abuse of constitutional rights. 
in	both	cases	the	court	felt	that	the	crcumstances	dd	not	fall	wthn	the	
concept	of	mscarrage	of	justce	and	appeals	were	lodged	wth	the	Supreme	
court.	in	March	1997	the	Supreme	court	gave	ts	judgments	n	both	on	the	same	
day.	in	the	decson	n	Pringle,115	Blayney	J,	gvng	judgment	for	the	court,	
referred	back	to	the	court	of	crmnal	appeal	decson,	and	stated	that	‘the	court	
did not attempt an exhaustive definition of the term miscarriage of justice and 
in my view this court should not attempt such a definition either. It is sufficient 
to	show	that	the	term	cannot	be	appled	to	the	facts	of	ths	case.’	Lynch	J,	n	a	
mnorty	judgment	that	would	be	reled	upon	n	many	later	cases,	ncludng	the	
Uk	case	of	Mullen,	drectly	questoned	what	was	meant	by	the	phrase:	
The Act of 1993 does not define the term … The primary meaning of 
mscarrage	of	justce	n	secton	9	of	the	act	of	199	s	that	the	applcant	
for the certificate is on the balance of probabilities innocent of the offence 
of	whch	he	was	convcted.11	
This has often been quoted as defining the term on the grounds of innocence 
but,	n	a	less	cted	part	of	the	judgment,	Lynch	J	contnued	to	outlne	that	‘there	
may	be	other	cases	such	as	…	a	case	nvolvng	such	a	departure	from	the	rules	
whch	permeate	all	judcal	procedure	as	to	make	that	whch	happened	not	n	
the	proper	use	of	the	word	judcal	or	consttutonal	procedure	at	all’.117
This was a much broader definition given in the Court of Criminal Appeal 
decson	n	Pringle. For the first time, albeit in a minority judgment, cases that 
had	reled	upon	mproper	and	unconsttutonal	procedures	were	brought	wthn	
the	ambt	of	the	term.	prngle	returned	to	the	court	of	crmnal	appeal	but	was	
unsuccessful.118 The definitional point did not arise in the Meleady and Grogan	
judgment,	though	the	reasonng	of	the	court	of	crmnal	appeal	on	other	ponts	
was deemed invalid, opening the possibility of a certificate being issued.119	
four	years	later	n	2001	(now	some	17	years	snce	the	ncdent	n	queston	
115.	 bd.
11.	 bd	245	(Sc).
117.	 bd.
118.	 Pringle v Ireland and the Attorney General	[1999]	4	ir	10	(cca).
119.	 The People (DPP) v Meleady and Grogan (No 2)	[1997]	2	ir	249	(Sc).
2	 Dublin University Law Journal [Vol	5
occurred,	 and	8	 years	 after	 the	 ntroducton	 of	 the	crmnal	procedure	act	
199),	Meleady	and	Grogan’s	case	returned	to	the	court	of	crmnal	appeal	
for	 consderaton.120 Applying the definition from Pringle	 the	court	 found	
that	the	new	facts	were	such	that	had	they	been	avalable	to	the	tral	judge	the	
identification evidence would have been excluded and, with no other evidence 
of	gult,	the	convcton	was	declared	a	mscarrage	of	justce.121	The	statements	
from	the	Supreme	court	were	consdered	n	detal	by	the	court.	Geoghegan	
J	acknowledged	that	Lynch	J’s	use	of	the	word	nnocent	could	have	dfferent	
nterpretatons:	‘t	mght	mean	“nnocent”	n	the	popular	sense	or	smply	“not	
gulty”	n	the	legal	sense’.	he	beleved	however	that	Lynch	J	had	ntended	t	
to mean the popular sense. Considering this definition, Geoghegan J made the 
poston	n	irsh	law	clear:
There	would	be	nsuperable	problems	n	ths	case	n	the	applcants	provng,	
as	a	matter	or	[sic]	probablty,	that	they	were	nnocent	n	the	non-legal	
or	popular	sense	of	that	word.	Ths	s	a	case	that	depended	entrely	on	
identification and this court does not believe that the Supreme Court would 
ever	have	ntended	that	ths	court	should	embark	on	a	full	cvl	tral	to	
determne	whether,	on	foot	of	the	newly	dscovered	facts,	the	applcants	
were,	as	a	matter	of	probablty,	nnocent	of	any	nvolvement	n	the	events	
…	ndeed	t	would	seem	hghly	undesrable.122
The difficulties discussed at the beginning of this article with setting the standard 
at	nnocence	were	clearly	apparent	to	the	court.	he	contnued:
in	 case	 there	 could	 be	 any	 ambguty,	 some	matters	 should	 be	made	
crystal clear. The court is not making any finding one way or the other 
as	to	whether	the	applcants	were	n	fact	nnocent	of	actual	nvolvement	
n	the	events.	That	knd	of	nnocence	would	not	even	have	been	proved	
a	result	of	an	acquttal	by	a	jury.	There	could	easly	be	cases	…	where	t	
would be clear that the applicant for the certificate under section 9 had no 
nvolvement	n	the	events	at	all.	But	t	s	equally	clear	that	the	Supreme	
Court was not intending to confine cases of miscarriage of justice to that 
type	of	stuaton.12
The Court clearly, then, did not wish to confine or limit the term to the concept 
of	nnocence,	prmarly	due	to	the	mpossble	evdental	burden	such	a	standard	
would	mpose.	indeed,	the	court	nferred	that	ths	evdental	ssue	was	the	reason	
that Blayney J had declined to define the term in Pringle (No 2).	Somewhat	
120.	 The People (DPP) v Meleady and Grogan	[2001]	4	ir	1	(cca).
121.	 [2001]	4	ir	1	(cca).
122.	 bd	27.
12.	 bd	2.
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bizarrely, having said the term extended beyond innocence, over the next five 
pages	of	the	judgment	the	court	dd	not	spend	tme	consderng	what	would	
consttute	 a	mscarrage	 of	 justce	 save	 for	 the	 concludng	 comment	 of	 the	
judgment	where	t	made	the	key	–	though	bref	–	statement	that	the	term	‘s	not	
confined to the question of actual innocence but extends to the administration 
n	a	gven	case	of	the	justce	system	tself’.124	applyng	ths	jursprudence	to	
the	case	at	hand,	t	was	held	that	the	tral	judge,	had	he	known	the	facts,	mght	
have excluded the identification evidence, in which case there would have been 
no	evdence	of	gult	to	put	to	the	jury.	on	ths	bass	the	court	ordered	that	there	
had	been	a	mscarrage	of	justce	n	Meleady	and	Grogan’s	case.	
Ths	case	then	drectly	brngs	nterference	wth	the	admnstraton	of	justce	
within the meaning of the term. While the problems with limiting the definition 
to	 nnocence	were	 explored	 there	 s	no	explanaton	provded	as	 to	why	 the	
Court developed the definition in this way. The Court has moved in the one 
case	from	sayng	that	the	term	cannot	be	lmted	to	nnocence	for	evdental	
grounds, to including the much broader definition that includes cases in which 
there	have	been	grave	defects	n	the	admnstraton	of	justce.	Ths	move	was	
not	necessarly	the	logcal	progresson	from	basng	the	term	n	one	of	nnocence.	
indeed	the	jursprudence	n	the	Uk	courts	shows	that	somewhat	of	a	mddle	
ground	can	be	found.	
The	practcal	mplcaton	of	ths	jursprudental	development	s	that	t	makes	
t	easer	to	make	a	clam,	once	a	new	or	newly	dscovered	fact	that	ponts	to	an	
nterference	n	the	admnstraton	of	justce	can	be	establshed.	That	sad,	t	s	not	
necessarly	wthout	problems.	in	People (DPP) v Shortt (No 2),125	the	next	case	
in which a certificate of miscarriage of justice was granted, the Court explicitly 
stated that this finding should not be interpreted as a finding of innocence. Shortt	
was	convcted	of	allowng	drugs	to	be	sold	n	hs	nghtclub.	after	the	tral,	t	
was established that the investigating gardaí had in fact set up the man, planted 
evdence	and	perjured	themselves	n	court	n	order	to	secure	the	convcton.	in	
that	case,	the	court	endorsed	the	Meleady definition: the term miscarriage of 
justce	encompasses	both	nnocence	and	an	nterference	wth	the	admnstraton	
of	justce.	indeed,	hardman	J	went	so	far	as	to	descrbe	what	occurred	n	that	
case	as	a	‘grave	defect	n	the	admnstraton	of	justce,	brought	about	by	agents	
of	the	State’.12	Meleady	was	nterpreted	by	hardman	J	as	havng	expanded	the	
definition and central to Shortt’s case was that evidence had been ‘deliberately 
suppressed’	by	agents	of	the	State.	The	delberate	concealment	of	documents	
by gardaí, the perjury of a garda who was the main prosecution witness, and 
the	 mportance	of	 these	documents	and	 ths	 testmony	to	 the	convcton	fell	
within this definition. However, the Court specifically outlined that they were 
not making a finding as to the innocence of the accused: ‘The issue is not as 
124.	 bd	.	
125.	 [2002]	2	ir	9	(cca).
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smple	snce	there	was	other	evdence,	n	the	addtonal	statement,	admttedly	
somewhat	general	and	tenuous,	as	to	the	course	of	busness	conducted	n	the	
applcant’s	premses	whch	mght	have	led	to	a	convcton.’127
Two	ponts	should	be	made	 n	 relaton	 to	 ths	case.	frst,	a	herarchy	of	
miscarriages of justice may emerge where a broad definition is adopted with 
some	applcants	actvely	havng	the	court	declare	that	they	were	nnocent	of	
the	offence	charged	and	others	‘just’	havng	ther	case	declared	a	mscarrage	
of	justce.	Qurk128	has	argued	that	usng	the	term	‘nnocent’	n	some	cases	can	
mpose	a	negatve	stgma	on	those	t	s	not	appled	to.	Thus,	those	who	succeed	
‘only’	because	of	an	argument	that	there	were	defects	n	the	admnstraton	of	
justce	may	stll	be	vewed	as	gulty	by	the	courts	and	socety	at	 large—the	
collectve	response	beng	‘he	got	off	on	a	techncalty’.	She	contends	that	n	ths	
way	we	create	two	ters	of	mscarrages	of	justce.	an	analyss	of	Shortt	suggests	
that	ths	may	not	be	problematc.	The	requrement	of	a	grave	admnstraton	of	
justce	s	an	exceptonally	hgh	standard	that	moves	the	case	beyond	a	smple	
retral	or	overturnng.	By	dong	that,	these	cases	are	beng	set	apart	as	nvolvng	a	
serous	njustce.	if	there	are	ters	emergng,	ths	case	suggests	that	t	s	rrelevant	
n	practce.	There	appears	to	be	a	collectve	normatve	apprecaton	of	the	grave	
crcumstances	that	must	exst	before	a	court	wll	declare	that	a	mscarrage	of	
justce	occurred	n	a	case.	The	Irish Independent	descrbed	frank	Shortt’s	case	as	
‘an	appallng	Vsta	where	no-one	dared	to	Say	Stop’.129	when	he	challenged	
the	award	of	damages	offered	by	the	Mnster	of	Justce,	the	Supreme	court	
dscussed	n	detal	the	devastatng	mpacts	of	hs	experences	and	awarded	hm	
€4.7 million in damages. Mr Shortt was not treated as any less of a victim on 
the	bass	that	the	court	could	not	actvely	declare	that	he	was	nnocent	of	the	
offence.	
The second point to note is that the Court specifically made reference to 
the	fact	that	the	grave	defect	was	brought	about	by	agents	of	the	State.	Ths	
renforces	the	vews	expressed	above	of	the	mportant	accountablty	functon	
of	the	applcaton	of	the	term.	it	s	not	just	about	the	experence	of	the	vctm.	it	
pants	a	very	clear	pcture	of	what	s	expected	by	the	crmnal	justce	system	n	
the	performance	of	ts	functons,	whch	perhaps	sts	well	wth	other	jursprudence	
of	the	irsh	courts.10	
Three	years	later	n	the	case	of	DPP v Nora Wall11 the	most	substantve	
definition of the term ‘miscarriage of justice’ to date was provided. In 2005 
Nora Wall received a certificate of a miscarriage of justice from the Court of 
crmnal	appeal.	She	had	been	 mprsoned	 n	1999	for	 lfe	on	a	convcton	
127.	 bd	709.
128.	 Qurk	(n	).
129.	 25	March	2007.
10.	 Such	as	People (DPP) v Kenny	[1990]	2	ir	110	(cca)	and	People (DPP) v Laide and 
Ryan	[2005]	1	ir	209	(cca).
11.	 [2005]	iecca	140.
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of	rape.	Sx	weeks	after	her	convcton	the	dpp	agreed	to	a	retral	after	some	
questons	 arose	 regardng	non-dsclosure	 of	 evdence	 relatng	 to	 one	of	 the	
wtnesses.	four	months	after	that	the	dpp	sad	he	would	not	be	pursung	the	
retral,	statng	that	the	accused	should	be	consdered	nnocent	of	all	the	charges	
and the Court thereby quashed the conviction. Wall, a nun, sought a certificate 
of	a	mscarrage	of	 justce	on	the	bass	of	newly	dscovered	facts.	The	dpp	
agreed at the hearing that a certificate should be granted. Kearns J, delivering 
judgment and granting the certificate, referring to the decision in Pringle (No 
2)12 stated, ‘an exhaustive definition of the term “miscarriage of justice” had 
not	been	attempted	by	the	court	of	crmnal	appeal	or	by	the	Supreme	court	
which has indicated that courts should not attempt such a definition’.1	That	
sad,	he	contnued:
examples	of	crcumstances	whch	may	consttute	a	mscarrage	of	justce	
nclude,	but	are	not	lmted	to	the	followng	–
a.	 where	 t	 s	 establshed	 that	 the	applcant	was	 nnocent	of	 the	
crme	alleged.
b.	 where	 a	 prosecuton	 should	 never	 have	 been	 brought	 n	 the	
sense	that	there	was	never	any	credble	evdence	mplcatng	the	
accused.
c.	 where	 there	 has	 been	 such	 a	 departure	 from	 the	 rules	whch	
permeate	 all	 judcal	 procedures	 as	 to	make	what	 happened	
altogether	 rreconclable	 wth	 judcal	 or	 consttutonal	
procedure.
d.	 where	 there	 has	 been	 a	 grave	defect	 n	 the	 admnstraton	of	
justce,	brought	about	by	agents	of	the	State	(The People (DPP) 
v Shortt	(No 2)	2	ir	9).
The	exercse	n	whch	the	court	s	engaged	under	the	act	of	199	s	to	
determne	whether	the	newly	dscovered	facts	show	that	a	mscarrage	of	
justice occurred and this is not confined to the question of actual innocence 
but	extends	to	the	admnstraton	n	a	gven	case	of	the	justce	system	tself	
(The People (DPP) v Meleady and Grogan	(No 3) [2001]	4	ir	1).
Ths	lst	effectvely	combnes	all	statements	from	the	courts	to	date	on	what	
consttutes	a	mscarrage	of	justce.	nor	s	ths	an	exhaustve	lst;	the	court	has	
retaned	the	dscreton	to	expand	ths	lst	n	the	future	should	cases	that	could	not	
prevously	have	been	contemplated	arse.	But	the	poston	of	the	courts	s	clear:	
n	ireland	mscarrages	of	justce	are	not	just	about	nnocence	but	are	strongly	
connected	to	the	operaton	of	the	crmnal	justce	system	and	the	protecton	of	
judcal	and	consttutonal	norms.
in	Wall, the Court found sufficient newly discovered facts to merit a finding 
12.	 DPP v Pringle (No 2)	[1997]	2	ir	225	(Sc).	
1.	 [2005]	iecca	140.
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of	a	mscarrage	of	justce.	one	of	the	complanants	had	a	hstory	of	makng	false	
complants	of	assault,	both	physcal	and	sexual,	and	had	a	hstory	of	psychatrc	
problems.	it	was	later	revealed	that	an	order	had	been	ssued	that	the	key	wtness	
should	not	be	called	at	tral,	havng	been	deemed	unrelable.	That	wtness	later	
admtted	to	a	frend	that	she	had	led	n	evdence,	n	sayng	that	she	had	been	an	
eyewitness to the events complained of. The Court was satisfied as a result that 
there	had	been	a	serous	defect	n	the	admnstraton	of	justce,	utlsng	agan	
the	language	of	Shortt.	There	were	a	varety	of	factors	that	led	to	a	concluson	
of	a	mscarrage	of	justce,	though	the	court	dd	not	specfy	whch	of	the	above	
crtera	t	felt	ths	case	fell	wthn.	The	court	dd	not,	however,	express	a	vew	
on	the	nnocence	of	the	applcant.	
The	statements	from	wall	have	not	snce	been	altered.	a	somewhat	surreal	
argument	arose	for	consderaton	n	the	court	of	crmnal	appeal	n	2009	n	
DPP v Hannon.14	Mr	hannon	had	been	convcted	of	sexual	assault	n	1997.	The	
convcton	was	based	solely	on	the	testmony	of	the	10-year-old	complanant.	
Mr	hannon	receved	a	four-year	suspended	sentence	as	the	court	dd	not	beleve	
he	had	a	propensty	for	crmnal	behavour	and	the	assault	had	taken	place	n	
the	context	of	a	famly	feud.	nne	years	later,	the	complanant,	who	had	snce	
moved	to	amerca,	returned	to	ireland	to	recant	her	statement	and	admt	that	she	
had falsified the allegation. Mr Hannon sought a declaration of miscarriage of 
justce.	The	dpp	challenged	the	applcaton,	argung	that	a	mscarrage	of	justce	
could	only	occur	where	there	s	some	‘fault	on	the	part	of	ether	the	prosecutor	
or	of	the	Garda	nvestgators	or	other	State	agents’.15	no	such	fault	had	been	
establshed.	it	was	accepted	that	the	case	was	well	nvestgated	and	tred,	but	
wth	just	the	complanant’s	testmony	as	evdence	t	was	smply	a	case	of	the	
jury	belevng	 a	 false	 story.	consderng	 the	 irsh	 case	 law,	 the	prosecuton	
submtted	that	there	had	been	no	case	n	ireland	nvolvng	a	declaraton	of	a	
mscarrage	of	justce	wthout	culpablty	beng	a	feature.	The	dpp	submtted	
that	‘culpablty	was	a	necessary	component	of	a	“mscarrage	of	justce”’.1	
The	possblty	of	two	persons	comng	together	to	deceve	the	court	and	share	
the	damages	n	such	a	case	was	rased.17	The	dpp	ponted	to	the	englsh	case	
of	Mullen v Home Secretary,18	n	whch	Lord	Bngham	n	the	house	of	Lords,	
speakng	for	the	majorty,	stated	that	compensaton	would	only	be	payable	for	
a	mscarrage	of	justce	where	there	had	been	a	falure	of	the	tral	process.	
14.	 [2009]	iecca	4.
15.	 bd.
1.	 bd.
17.	 presumably,	the	reasonng	of	the	dpp	was	that	a	vctm	and	offender	could	resolve	ther	
dfferences	and	agree	to	jontly	commt	a	fraud	on	the	State,	where	the	vctm	would	
recant	ther	testmony,	upon	whch	bass	the	offender	would	apply	for	compensaton	
on	 foot	 of	 an	 applcaton	 for	 a	mscarrage	 of	 justce.	 it	 s	 argued	here	 that	whle	
theoretcally	possble,	the	lkelhood	of	ths	ever	occurrng	s	neglgble,	and	a	classc	
example	of	the	maxm	‘hard	cases	make	bad	law’.
18.	 [2004]		aer	5	(hL).
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The	suggeston	was	effectvely	that	such	was	the	ntegraton	of	the	ssue	
of procedural justice into the Irish definition of the term that unless this was 
present,	there	was	no	mscarrage	of	justce.	Some	debate	on	ths	ssue	had	arsen	
prevously.	 in	Shortt	 the	dpp	had	 tred	 to	argue	 that	 the	 term	solely	related	
to	nnocence.19	That	court	dsagreed	but	proceeded	to	develop	ts	logc	n	a	
somewhat	curous	manner:	
if the granting of a certificate does not always or necessarily imply a 
positive finding of innocence, it must follow that a positive finding of 
innocence is not necessary to the granting of a certificate. In fact, it occurs 
to	us	that	an	nnocent	person	could	be	wrongfully	convcted	wthout	gvng	
rise to a miscarriage of justice (as where a court jury bona fide accepts 
identification evidence which turns out to be wrong). Equally a guilty 
person	could	be	wrongfully	convcted	as	n	Mr	comyn’s	[counsel	for	the	
dpp]	example	n	submssons	of	a	person	undoubtedly	gulty	of	the	offence	
but	convcted	on	the	bass	of	conscous	and	delberate	perjury.140
Ths	was	a	partcularly	unhelpful	obiter	statement,	whch	rased	the	potental	
that	an	nnocent	person	may	not	be	able	to	aval	of	the	remedes	reserved	for	
mscarrage	of	justce	cases.	hardman	J	n	Hannon	admttedly	restrcted	hs	
comments to whether this particular applicant was entitled to a certificate, clearly 
statng	that	 ths	analyss	was	not	 to	be	confused	‘wth	the	cognate	but	qute	
separate	queston	as	to	whether	only	a	person	whose	nnocence	s	recognsed	
or incontrovertible is entitled to such a certificate …’
in	the	further	court	of	crmnal	appeal	judgments	n	Shortt	ths	anomalous	
comment	was	 not	 addressed,	 but	 n	Wall kearns	 J	 explctly	 stated	 that	
innocence was a clear example of a miscarriage. These conflicting statements 
were,	however,	from	the	same	court.	Thus	n	Hannon,	t	was	n	fact	a	vable,	f	
dsappontng,	argument	for	the	dpp	to	make.	The	court,	unsurprsngly,	found	
no	 requrement	 of	State	 fault	 for	 a	mscarrage	 of	 justce	 to	 have	occurred.	
Hardiman J commented, ‘It is difficult to know what is more obviously within 
the	ordnary	or	dctonary	meanng	of	the	phrase	“mscarrage	of	justce”	than	
the	 convcton	 of	 an	 nnocent	 person.’141	The	court	 declned	 to	 follow	 the	
findings of the Court in Mullen,	and	noted	the	authortatve	statements	n	both	
Meleady	and	Shortt	as	to	the	approprate	constructon	of	the	phrase	‘mscarrage	
of	justce’.	Thus,	as	Langwallner	correctly	ponts	out,	the	meanng	of	the	term	
miscarriage of justice is ‘an evolving standard and is not confined to factual 
19.	 DPP v Shortt	[2002]	2	ir	8	(cca).
140.	 [2002]	2	ir	8	(cca)	92.
141.	 [2009]	iecca	4.
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nnocence’142	but	despte	the	dpp’s	attempts	t	seems	clear	that	t	does	nclude	
nnocent	persons.
VII. conclusIon
a	number	of	observatons	can	be	made	of	ths	seres	of	cases.	The	wall	case	
sets	out	four	nstances	that	should	be	consdered	mscarrages	of	justce:	actual	
innocence, where the prosecution should not have been brought in the first place, 
where	judcal	and	consttutonal	procedure	has	been	departed	from	and	where	
there	has	been	a	grave	defect	n	the	admnstraton	of	justce.	it	s	mportant	to	
point out, reflecting on our earlier comparative analysis, that when this decision 
was	taken	n	2005	the	only	clear	approach	emergng	from	other	jursdctons	was	
to	focus	on	factual	nnocence.	whle	t	may	have	taken	them	a	decade	to	get	to	
that	pont	from	the	ntal	applcatons,	to	strke	out	so	nnovatvely	aganst	the	
emergng	nternatonal	trend	n	ths	way	sets	ireland	apart	n	ts	dedcaton	to	
due	process.	it	was	not	untl	2011	that	the	Uk	would	move	n	ths	drecton.	
further,	n	our	ntal	analyss	of	the	tensons	generated	by	these	cases,	we	
noted	that	one	ssue	regardng	the	ncluson	of	cases	where	t	mght	be	contended	
that	the	vctm	of	the	mscarrage	of	justce	dd	commt	the	crme	n	queston	was	
that	t	mght	generate	such	a	number	of	cases	that	the	crmnal	justce	system	s	
brought into disrepute. However, in spite of the breadth of the Irish definition 
there	have	n	the	(almost)	two	decades	snce	the	ntroducton	of	the	act	been	
only a handful of cases. This hardly represents the opening of floodgates. Nor 
have	the	irsh	decsons	and	ther	repercussons	suggested	that	Qurke	s	correct	
n	assertng	that	a	herarchy	of	vctms	would	be	created	by	such	broadenng	of	
the definition. The reason for both is that while the definition is broad, it still 
requres	a	very	hgh	standard	of	falure	from	the	crmnal	justce	system,	and	
the	burden	of	proof	on	the	applcant	to	prove	a	mscarrage	of	justce	occurred	
s	equally	onerous.	phrases	such	as	‘never	been	brought’,	‘rreconclable	wth	
consttutonal	procedure’,	and	‘grave	defect’	all	reserve	the	label	of	mscarrage	
of	justce	for	the	most	extreme	cases	and	the	worst	falures	on	the	part	of	the	
system.	it	s	not	a	standard	that	wll	be	easly	met	by	applcants.	Ths	s	as	t	
should	be.	The	worst	falures	wll	be	labelled	as	such.	Thus	the	ntegrty	of	the	
system	s	renforced	and	not	dluted.	
Ths	approach	leaves	many	ssues	unresolved:	what	evdence	wll	be	needed	
to	reach	that	standard?	do	ndvduals	have	approprate	access	to	the	courts?	
Are those who secure a certificate actually getting compensation? Even within 
ireland	there	s	much	we	can	stll	queston.	But,	by	rejectng	the	populst	agenda	
of	‘nnocence’	the	Supreme	court	have	placed	consttutonal	rghts	and	values	
four-square	at	the	heart	of	the	crmnal	justce	system.	whle	the	layperson	mght	
142.	 davd	Langwallner,	‘Mscarrages	of	Justce	n	ireland:	a	Survey	of	the	Jursprudence	
wth	Suggestons	for	the	future’	(2011)	2(1)	iJLS	22,	2.
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indeed associate a miscarriage of justice with innocence, the legal definition of 
the term must reject any finding of guilt supported by evidence that disrupted 
the	carrage	of	justce.	The	irsh	courts	must	be	commended	for	ths	approach	
to	an	nternatonally	thorny	ssue.	it	vndcates	the	poston	of	those	vctms	and	
gves	them	a	rght	to	compensaton	whle	protectng	due	process	values	and	
ensurng	the	ntegrty	and	accountablty	of	the	crmnal	justce	system.	
